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OUR LEGAL CHAMELEON, THE FLORIDA
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION: V
HAROLD B. CROSBY AND GEORGE JOHN MILLER
PART V - THE Two TAX EXCLUSIONS*
1. Basic Preliminary Considerations
The exemptions of homestead realty and personalty from forced sale,
and the exclusions of portions of each from taxation, are fundamentally
different concepts. 4 63 There are four distinct species of our chameleon,
re-enumerated in this footnote; 4 64 and, while an individual may at times
find all four on his property, he may also discover, at a crucial moment,
that he has only one. They all have certain similarities, and a still
greater number of differences. In the interest of clarity the basic dis-
tinctions between the two forced sale chameleons and the two tax chame-
leons are summarized.
*This concludes the discussion of the law of Florida homestead exemptions. Parts
I-III, appearing in 2 U. oF FLA. L. REV. 12-83 (1949), deal with the realty and per-
sonalty exemptions from forced sale and the effect of inurement of the former upon
transfer; Part IV, in 2 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 219-242 (1949), analyzes the procedural
aspects of homestead exemptions; Part V is a study of the tax exclusions. Footnotes
are numbered consecutively throughout. The full text of Article X of the Florida
Constitution is reproduced in 2 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 83-84; Section 7 thereof governs
the residence exclusion. The homestead personalty tax exclusion, found in FLA. CONST.
Art. IX, §11 reads:
"... . there shall be exempt from taxation to the head of the family residing in
this State, household goods and personal effect [sic] to the value of Five Hun-
dred ($500.00) Dollars ......
... Shambow v. Shambow, 153 Fla. 760, 15 So.2d 836 (1943); compare Nelson v.
Franklin, 152 Fla. 694, 12 So.2d 771 (1943), and Miller v. West Palm Beach Atl. Nat.
Bank, 142 Fla. 22, 23, 194 So. 230 (1940) (homestead for descent purposes found not
to exist, though residence exclusion allowed), with Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374,
7 So.2d 443 (1942) (allowance of residence exclusion accorded some evidentiary value
in establishing domicile). Cf. 2 U. oF FLA. L. REV. 232 (1949).
... These are: exemption of all homestead realty from forced sale; exemption of
$1,000 of homestead personalty from forced sale; exclusion for tax purposes of $5,000
from the assessed valuation of Florida realty resided upon by a legal or equitable owner
or by his dependents; and exclusion from taxation of $500 of the assessed valuation of
household goods and personal effects of the head of the family residing in Florida.
Admittedly the personalty forced sale exemption is in reality a $1,000 exclusion from
[ 346 ]
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It is well to emphasize first, however, that the so-called "homestead
tax exemption" itself embraces two species, one relating to realty and the
other to personalty. Both are partial only; they reduce the taxable base,
reckoned in assessed valuation, by a certain dollar amount, which is $5,000
in the case of realty and $500 in the case of personalty. Furthermore,
any relation that the realty exemption may bear to the family is purely
coincidental; for this reason it is here described by a term that suits it,
namely, the "residence exclusion." Family headship is not required.
The personalty exclusion, on the other hand, is truly homestead as this
concept has traditionally been understood in Florida law; family head-
ship is required.
Reported cases dealing with the residence and personalty exclusions
are few, but fortunately the Attorney General of the State of Florida has
been consulted frequently with regard to most of the problems involved.
His opinions form a clear, concise, logical, and- so the authors of this
article believe -practical body of interpretive material. Admittedly an
occasional conclusion of doubtful validity can be found, 4 65 but on the
whole these expositions constitute a valuable segment of our jurisprudence.
Though not binding on the courts, they do represent the considered judg-
ment of the senior legal officer of the State of Florida, aided by an able
staff, and are accordingly entitled to considerable weight; heavy reliance
is placed on them here. The manner of citation is detailed below.
46 6
levy on all personal property of the family head; and the word "homestead" can at
times signify the home of a single person. But the phrase "homestead personalty ex-
emption" has always been associated with forced sale, and protection of the family
has been the mainspring of homestead law in Florida since 1868, cf. 2 U. oF FLA. L.
Rzv. 13-17 (1949) ; accordingly four different terms are employed herein to emphasize
the distinct natures of our four species.
"'REP. A'r'Y GEN. 158 (1941) constitutes an example of this. The problem
raised as to family headship is irrelevant, while the highly significant factor of rural or
urban location is overlooked; but errors in these opinions in the homestead field are as
rare as those in judicial opinions or law review articles.
"'Individual opinions, upon release, bear a date and, more recently, a serial
number. After each even-numbered year they are classified by subject-matter and
published in an unnumbered bound volume known as the BiENNmr REPORT Or T=E
AToa iY GEN Pm. Although otherwise well indexed, the volume does not tabulate
the opinions by either serial number or date; consequently citations herein to
opinions through 1948 specify the page in the bound volume, which in turn is readily
identified by the year in which the opinion was rendered, even though each volume
bears on its bound edge a two-year date. Month and day are not given unless two
relevant opinions begin on the same page. Opinions released in 1949 are cited by
serial number, month, day and year.
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For the sake of brevity, conclusions are stated rather dogmatically; the
reader can readily ascertain by glancing at the footnotes whether the au-
thority for the statement is a decision of the Supreme Court of Florida
or, in the absence of reported cases, an opinion of the Attorney General.
Similarities. First, the tax exclusions and the forced sale exemptions
are called by the same name; indeed, they are all lumped together on oc-
casion, as in the title of this article, under the term "the homestead ex-
emption." In popular parlance this misnomer can be justified; but from
the standpoint of legal analysis a steer and a carrot could with equal logic
be termed identical because both are used in a beef-stew. One must con-
stantly remind himself that the homestead exemption is a chameleon, or
rather several species of this genus, each of which changes color to accord
with the background against which he is viewed. In the field of taxation
he takes on still another hue, which is usually red when he comes in con-
tact with county and municipal finances. His perch, technically speak-
ing, is the assessed valuation of a residence, or of household goods and
personal effects; he is often large enough to cover this valuation entire-
ly; 4 67 and he has become today one of the most prolific and jealously
guarded little reptiles in the entire State of Florida.
Second, the tax exclusions and the forced sale exemptions are both
cumulative; in other words, exemption or exclusion on a homestead or
residence basis does not eliminate or limit any other exemption or ex-
clusion.
4 68
Third, as regards both the two forced sale exemptions and the two tax
exclusions, realty and personalty are governed by strikingly different
principles.
4 6 9
Fourth, citizenship is not a requisite for any of these exemptions or
exclusions today.
Fifth, the problems arising in connection with the meaning of "resi-
dence," and the related concept of physical abandonment, are remarkably
similar in both forced sale and tax law.
'"This assessed valuation, as we shall see, rarely equals the actual value of the
property as reckoned by realtors and other business men; cf. Part V, 8 infra.
"'8REP. ATT'y GEN. 776 (1946) ; 71 (Jan. 22, 1935) ; 71, 83 (Jan. 10, 1935). For an
example of additional exclusions see FLA. CONST. Art. IX, §9. Cf. 2 U. or FLA. L.
REv. 78 (1949) as regards forced sale.
"'These similarities and differences, stated now in summary form, are later dis-
cussed in detail. Footnote citations are largely postponed at this point, in order to
avoid unnecessary duplication.
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Sixth, the physical extent of the realty is expressly made the same,
with the sharp distinction between rural and urban; furthermore, conti-
guity is normally essential.
Seventh, assessments for special benefits to realty are excepted from
both the forced sale exemption and the residence exclusion.
Eighth, the prohibition of reduction of the size of exempt realty by
involuntary inclusion within city limits applies in the forced sale and tax
fields.
Ninth, the personalty tax exclusion, like its forced sale counterpart,
does not depend on ownership of any realty or estate therein.
Finally, although our chameleon always perches either on property or
on its assessed valuation, he must be born somehow. The parents of the
forced sale chameleon are a homesteader and a debt,4 7 0 while the tax
chameleon is the offspring of a tax and a residence in the case of realty,
or of a tax and household goods and personal effects owned by the head
of a family in the case of personalty. Without a tax, if one could imagine
such a delightful condition, there would be no need for any exclusion; and
of course it cannot be used to reduce taxes of a different nature. The ex-
clusion is confined to the specific types of property designated, and fur-
nishes no protection against taxes based on a different incidence or ob-
ject-matter.
Differences. The differences between the forced sale exemptions on
the one hand, and the tax exclusions on the other, are of even greater
importance than are the similarities.
First, although the claimant of the personalty tax exclusion must be
the head of the family, the applicant for the residence exclusion need
not be.
Second, this residence exclusion applies to some, but not to all, of those
lesser estates or interests in realty that serve as a perch for the forced
sale chameleon.
Third, the personalty tax exclusion, unlike the personalty forced sale
exemption, does not embrace all types of personal property.
Fourth, the exclusion from the taxable base does not inure to the widow
and heirs; they must establish each year exclusions of their own after the
death of the owner.
Fifth, only one residence exclusion is allowed per dwelling house; the
taxgatherer, although he does not shut his eyes entirely to the claimant
'"Cf. 2 U. or FLz. L. REv. 23 (1949).
4
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for exclusion purposes, fixes his gaze on the realty itself when collection
is involved.
Sixth, the tax chameleons can never grow to be iguanas. The realty
species is limited to $5,000 of the assessed valuation, while the personalty
species is fully grown at $500, when only half the size of his $1,000
brother, the personalty forced sale chameleon.
Seventh, the perch of both tax chameleons is fixed once a year, on
New Year's Day, and remains unchanged throughout the year.
Eighth, the tax chameleons must be caught annually on or before
April 1; the right to either exclusion is lost if not positively asserted by
this date each year.
Ninth, the judge, who beams fondly upon our merry forced sale
chameleons as they scamper about, looks with a cold and fishy eye on the
younger brothers; claimants of the tax exclusions are not in theory favored
with that "liberal construction" accorded the exemptions from forced
sale,4 7 1 although it must be conceded that the bench has not been overly
stern.
Tenth, procedural morasses are more easily detected; at least they lie
where one usually expects to stumble into them in tax-law territory.
Only a few of the adjective provisions are peculiar to homestead law.
Eleventh, the residence exclusion, unlike the exemptions from forced
sale, is most unusual in the United States; for better or for worse, Florida
has deliberately cut off from the impoverished treasuries of her counties
and cities a source of revenue considered normal and equitable by most
Americans.
Finally, the residence and the personalty exclusions are in no wise a
shield against forced sale. Taxes levied against the property to the
extent of the excess of its assessed valuation over and above the respective
$5,000 and $500 deductions must be paid, or forced sale for delinquency
follows. The related question as to whether liability for taxes not levied
against such property can nevertheless be enforced against it depends
entirely on Section 1 rather than Section 7 of Article X.472
'"Cf. 2 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 14-16 (1949).
'4-CJ. Florida Industrial Comm'n v. Coleman, 154 Fla. 744, 18 So.2d 905 (1944),
and the discussion in 2 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 18 (1949). The constitutional issue is still
debatable. Attorney General Gibbs expressed the opinion that the homestead per-
sonalty exemption from forced sale did not bar levy on the automobile of a taxpayer
delinquent in meeting taxes on whisky found in his still, REP. ATT'y GEN . 521 (1940) ;
Attorney General Watson saw no constitutional objection to extending this doctrine to
the collection of workmen's compensation by selling the home of the employer, REP.
5
Crosby and Miller: Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption Part V
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
OUR LEGAL CHAMELEON
History. The older of the two so-called homestead tax exclusions,
which truly deserves the appellation "homestead," is the one applicable to
personalty. As might be expected in any constitution that has grown by
political spurts rather than systematically, 47 3 the personalty exclusion and
the residence exclusion appear in separate articles, and the one that bears
no logical relation to the family is in Article X.
The personalty exclusion was adopted in 1924, along with the pro-
hibition of state income tax and inheritance and estate taxes, and today
lies buried between this prohibition and the 1930 proviso authorizing
estate and inheritance taxes in limited form.
4 7 4
The adoption of the forerunner of the residence exclusion was com-
pleted by sundown of November 6, 1934, and was effective immediate-
ly.4 75 It required that the claimant be not only a resident but also a
citizen of Florida, as well as the head of a family. It further provided
that "title to said homestead may be vested in such head of a family or
in his lawful wife residing upon such homestead or in both." Assessments
were insulated from exemption by the phrase "special assessments for
benefits."
After first securing adoption of the amendment by the citizens of
Florida as an exemption to the head of the family, however, the Legis-
lature promptly disregarded the basic reason employed in obtaining their
ATTfY Gsar. 585 (1942), even though payment of other legally recognized business
debts, having equally as much relation to the home, cannot be compelled in this
manner. Both opinions rest on the monarchial premise that the sovereign must be
allowed to use virtually any sort of pressure to gather the revenues it wishes. However
sound this notion may have been in the United States when government was limited
to true community functions, it merits re-examination today. Cf. the prophetic
insight exhibited by Brown, C. J., over twenty years ago, in Earle v. Dade County,
92 Fla. 432, 437-438, 109 So. 331, 333 (1926). The doctrine expressed by Sebring, J., in
St. Petersburg v. Fiore, 33 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1948), though not in point on the constitu-
tional question, exhibits a wholesome trend.
'7VThis is not to say that the Florida Constitution does not function fairly well in
practice, thanks largely to an industrious Supreme Court and an active Florida State
Bar Association. Whatever view one may entertain as to its substance, however, the
need for at least formal revision is obvious to any logical mind. Cf. David, The Case
for Constitutional Revision in Florida, 3 MIAmi L. Q. 225 (1949); Redfearn, A New
Constitution for Florida, 21 FLA. L. J. 2 (1947).
'"F. CONsT. Art. IX, §11.
'FxLA. CoNsT. Art. X, §7, as then adopted. Cf. Dame, The Homestead Exemp-
tion Amendment, 9 FLA. L. J. 399, 400, 403 (1935). This date is important even today
in identifying those bond issues for which homesteads are liable taxwise; see Im-
pairment of Obligation of Contract, Part V, 2 infra.
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approval by passing Section 2 of Chapter 17060 of Florida Laws 1935,
removing this requirement of family headship. This statute is the true
father of the present Section 7, adopted November 8, 1938, and effective
January 1, 1939.476 The resolutions leading to the 1938 proposal went
through several drafts in the Legislature in the process of formulation,
without much improvement over the 1935 statute; 4 7 7 and the braintwister
that we now struggle with was the result.
The requirement of citizenship was eliminated, and perhaps even the
necessity of Florida residence by the claimant. 4 78 Family headship was
scuttled. Contiguity was specifically made a requisite. The provisions
as to title were broadened; assessments were this time referred to as
"assessments for special benefits"; and limitations, or expansions as the
case may be,4 7 9 were added as regards the amounts that could be claimed
by each of several owners. The Legislature, though already directed
by Section 6 of this same article to enact enforcement laws, was this time
additionally authorized, though not directed, to "prescribe appropriate
and reasonable laws regulating the manner of establishing the right to
said exemption."
Chapters 192 and 200 of the current Florida Statutes, as well as 193
to some extent, contain the supplementary legislative provisions of today.
Construction. That each of the various participants in the framing
of Section 7 as it now stands had a definite idea should be assumed; but
that in concert they succeeded admirably in concealing their thoughts is
beyond question. It is of course widely recognized that proponents of
varying principles not infrequently experience difficulty in reaching a
common denominator, with the result that the final product is satisfactory
to all because clear to none. Such is Section 7. It has turned our chameleon
into a veritable kaleidoscope. Ultimately the correct color-patterns will
be selected by the judiciary; but in the meantime we can at least examine
the possible combinations, and can perhaps remove some of the mirrors.
A parenthetical word is pertinent at this point. The members of our
Legislature are in the main practical men with valuable ideas; but a
mastery of the precise phraseology essential to administration of their
'"FLA. CONST. Art. X, §7. The gist of the 1935 statute now appears, in modified
form, as FLA. STAT. §§192.12, 192.13 (1941).
'7"REP. ArT'y GEar. 438 (1939) presents a scholarly analysis of the legislative
history of the 1938 amendment.
-"The word "perhaps" is used advisedly; see Residence in Part V, 3 infra.
179This vexing problem is analyzed in detail in Part V, 7 infra.
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concepts in individual cases cannot, in fairness, be always expected. This
is not to say that their ideas are muddled; compromise terminology is
notoriously vague, and even clear general rules do not always cut cleanly
among borderline instances in application. It is confidently expected
that the excellent start made by Statutory Revisor Henderson and Direc-
tor Weiss of the Legislative Reference Bureau will in time result in a close
approximation of the legislative intent and the formulation thereof that
a judge or administrative official is bound to follow.
Whenever ambiguity appears on the horizon, the bench opens fire
with its battery of canons of construction.48 0 If the vessel in which
ambiguity rides be a statute imposing liability, one canon spouts a strict
construction in favor of the taxpayer.481  If, on the other hand, the ship
happens to be a statute exempting taxpayers assumed to be already liable,
another canon belches forth a strict construction against the taxpayer.
48 2
The use of canon, and the validity of the distinction between the two
heavy rifles just described, are subjects beyond the scope of this discus-
sion. The important point is that each canon is firmly mounted, and
that both, taken together, produce those shifting tactical maneuvers that
are the pride of the judiciary, the marvel of laymen, the life-blood of prac-
titioners, and the despair of law students. The second canon, namely,
strict construction against the taxpayer, is the one employed to blast
claimants of homestead tax exclusions, precisely because Section 7 of
Article X and Section 11 of Article IX are formally so phrased as to
create exemptions rather than to impose liability.
2. The Underlying Obligation
Impairment of Obligation of Contract. The supreme law of the land
is the Constitution of the United States; whenever a federal question is
'80The uses of these in the law were sharply analyzed and firmly established by
Cicero, particularly in his discussion de inventione. A masterful summary, embracing
the influence of Plato and Aristotle, is presented by Huntington Cairns in his LmAL
PHIosoPHy zo d P ATo To HTca 151-160 (1949), reviewed in 2 U. or FrA. L. REV.
308 (1949). Their semblance of certainty is highly deceptive; they are so mounted
that there is at least one pointing in any desired direction.
"'1E.g., State ex rej. Tampa Electric Co. v. Gay, 40 So.2d 225, 229 (Fla. 1949);
De Vore v. Gay, 39 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1949); Peninsular Tel. Co. v. Clearwater, 39 So.2d
473, 475 (Fla. 1949); Cunningham v. Stefanidi, 144 Fla. 214, 197 So. 722 (1940);
State ex rel. Rogers v. Sweat, 113 Fla. 797, 152 So. 432 (1934).
,82".g., Steuart v. State ex rd. Dolcimascolo, 119 Fla. 117, 161 So. 378 (1935); Rast
v. Hulvey, 77 Fla. 74, 85, 80 So. 750, 753 (1919); see Lummus v. Florida-Adirondack
8
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involved this atomic bomb is dropped. Section 10 of Article I prohibits
the states from passing any "Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts
. " Against this the Florida Constitution cannot prevail; 48 3 and
accordingly homestead realty once contractually obligated as a source of
tax revenue to meet liabilities incurred by some governmental unit remains
chargeable, so long at least as it remains legally within the unit, despite
any subsequent relief attempted by Florida law.
For this reason the date of adoption of the original homestead tax
amendment is still of practical import; after such date anyone furnishing
credit against "security," in the form of tax revenues from all property
subject to taxation, has had constructive notice that this security cannot
include taxes on the first $5,000 of the assessed valuation of residences
qualifying under Section 7. Property owned by those meeting the re-
quirements of Florida citizenship and residence, as well as of family
headship and title held in a certain manner, 4 8 4 cannot be taxed, to the
extent of the exclusion limit, for debts incurred after November 6, 1934.
For aliens and for all persons not heads of families, as well as for those
holding title in the more liberal ways permitted today, the material date
is November 8, 1938.485
Not all governmental debts are protected by the impairment principle.
The prolixity of litigation involving this factor connotes serious concep-
tual difficulty, but the line of demarcation has been drawn clearly and con-
sistently. The basic issue, well posed by Mr. Justice Buford in State v.
West Palm Beach,48 6 involves two questions only: (1) the existence of
School, Inc., 123 Fla. 811, 821, 168 So. 232, 237 (1936).
' 3It is, of course, essential that one alleging impairment must prove it, American
Can Co. v. Tampa, 152 Fla. 798, 811, 14 So.2d 203, 211 (1943); the canon of strict
construction against the claimant of exemption does not apply at this stage.
...From 1934 through 1938 the holder of title was necessarily either the family
head, his lawful wife residing on the property, or both.
...It is apparent that some resident owners entitled to the $5,000 exclusion under
the 1938 amendment could not qualify under Section 7 as adopted for true homesteaders
in 1934, and are accordingly liable on all secured obligations of their governmental
entities issued on or before November 8, 1938.
...127 Fla. 849, 174 So. 334 (1937) ; cf. Groves v. Board of Public Instruction, 109
F.2d 522 (C. C. A. 5th 1940) ;Long v. St. John, 126 Fla. 1, 170 So. 317 (1936);
contrast Board of Public Instruction v. State ex rel. Barefoot, 145 Fla. 482, 199 So.
760 (1941) (promissory notes), with Coral Gables v. State, 128 Fla. 874, 176 So. 40
1937) (mere tort judgments and stated account). In this connection note carefully
the technical pitfall dug by the Supreme Court in Fleming v. Turner, 122 Fla. 200, 211-
212, 215, 165 So. 353, 358, 359 (1935). The surprising factor is the willingness of the
9
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the debt on November 6, 1934, or on November 8, 1938 in the other in-
stances just mentioned; and (2) the inclusion of the otherwise exempt
property among the lands that lay within the jurisdiction of the govern-
mental debtor upon creation of the obligation, and that were then liable,
by virtue of the pledge of tax revenues derived or to be derived therefrom,
as underlying security for the debt. If the property was then taxable,
no residence exclusion is permitted, provided, of course, that there was
at the time a specific contract obligating the tax revenues of the govern-
mental unit as distinct from a mere unsecured obligation. Debts of a
general nature, no matter when incurred, cannot be met by taxing ex-
cluded property. Stated somewhat differently, the line is sharply drawn
between funded debt and floating debt, between refunding bonds and
funding bonds.
Furthermore, the original bonds must have been issued, that is, negoti-
ated by the issuer, on or before November 6, 1934, or November 8, 1938,
as the case may be. Mere authorization of the issue does not of itself
confer any rights on a future bondholder. He is not prejudiced by any
provisions of Section 7 enacted before actual issuance of the bonds he
holds; no law already in existence at that time can possibly impair the
obligation of his subsequent contract, since all such law forms a part
thereof.
4 8 7
Alteration of the law must not, of course, be confused with changes
in factual conditions under existing law. If an owner of vacant land
Court, on the mere ground of judicial convenience, to approve a dangerous trap for
honest laymen in order to relieve a taxpayer admittedly obligated, the sole loophole
for his escape being lack of abstruse legal knowledge on the part of certain county
commissioners.
"'REP. Airey GEN. 458 (1939). The sharp distinction between impairment of the
obligation of a contract and impairment of the right to make a contract, both of which
are sometimes confused in the loose phrase "impairment of contract," should be clearly
'visualized. A contract must exist before any obligation thereof can arise to be im-
paired, whereas the constitutionality of laws restricting freedom to enter into contracts
of a given type previously unobjectionable is a problem of substantive due process, and
has no bearing here. This latter type of unconstitutionality is well illustrated in
Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949), discussed
infra in Legis., 2 U. oF FLA. L. Rv. 408 (1949).
From a somewhat different angle, no bondholder can look to property outside the
jurisdiction of the debtor at the time his bonds were originally issued; therefore resi-
dences incorporated into a municipality after the adoption of Section 7 are not tax-
able, to the extent of any residence exclusion they may have, even for the purpose of
meeting its secured obligations existing prior to such adoption, REP. Air-e GaN. 777
(1946).
10
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later makes it his residence or that of his dependents on or before Jan-
uary I of any year, he can claim the residence exclusion for such year
even as against bonds already outstanding at the time, provided they were
issued after enactment of the 1934 or the 1938 amendment, whichever
happens to be pertinent; the holder of such bonds has constructive notice,
upon his acquisition thereof, that the character of property for exclusion
purposes is required by law to be determined afresh on the first day of
each year, and that this may well vary from year to year.
Asessments. Detailed treatment and delimitation of the various kinds
of taxes, as well as any intensive analysis of the features that distinguish
taxes as a whole from assessments, would require a separate and lengthy
discussion. Accordingly, the most that can be attempted here is to sketch
broadly the line drawn by our Supreme Court, and to state the primary
basis of distinction. This has seldom, if ever, been more clearly sum-
marized than by Mr. Chief Justice Terrell in Klemm v. Davenport.4 8 8
The difference, as might be expected, is one of degree, and rests upon
special enhancement of the value of the specific property lying within the
designated area.
By way of illustration, the category of assessments includes not only
such unquestioned expenses as paving4 8 9 but also those incurred by drain-
'88100 Fla. 627, 631, 129 So. 904, 907 (1930):
"A tax is an enforced burden of contribution imposed by sovereign right for
the support of the government, the administration of the law, and to execute the
various functions the sovereign is called on to perform. A special assessment
is like a tax in that it is an enforced contribution from the property owner, it
may possess other points of similarity to a tax but it is inherently different and
governed by entirely different principles. It is imposed upon the theory that that
portion of the community which is required to bear it receives some special or
peculiar benefit in the enhancement of value of the property against which it is
imposed as a result of the improvement made with the proceeds of the special
assessment. It is limited to the property benefited, is not governed by uni-
formity and may be determined legislatively or judicially."
Cf. Martin v. Dade Muck Land Co., 95 Fla. 530, 574-578, 116 So. 449, 464-465 (1928).
'89Special benefit to abutting property is required even as to paving, Rafkin v.
Miami Beach, 38 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1949), in which the city seriously impaired the value
of residential property by widening an adequate street and diverting heavy traffic into
this area for the convenience of motorists generally, and then actually sought to make
the unfortunate owners pay for the paving as a "special benefit." A majority of four
refused to permit this sly maneuver.
11
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age districts 490 and special inland navigation districts,4 9 1 as well as by
special road and bridge districts whenever a special benefit peculiar to
district property can be shown.4 9 2 Conversely, it does not embrace a
school, 4 9 3 or a county hospital abortively set up as the instrumentality of
a special district.
4 94
The tax exclusions are specifically adapted to realty, ownership in the
broad sense, and residence, or alternatively to household goods and per-
sonal effects, ownership, and family headship. Therefore our tax chame-
leons are always found on the ad valorem tax, which, as its name indicates,
is reckoned on valuation and is based on the taxable incidence of ownership.
Excise, license and privilege taxes, while their object-matter may happen
to be real or personal property, rest on different taxable incidences; ac-
cordingly our chameleons cannot find a footing on them, even though
the right to acquire, use, transfer or consume various material things, or
to engage in a profession or vocation, is regarded from some viewpoints
as a property right. Utility taxes, collected by the company from the
consumer and transmitted to the governmental entity imposing the tax,
have been classified as excise or license taxes.
4 9 5
Whether the conversion of the 1934 phrase "special assessments for
benefits" into the 1938 "assessments for special benefits" signifies any
'Martin v. Dade Muck Land Co., 95 Fla. 530, 116 So. 449 (1928). See note 499
infra, however.
"'State ex rd. Board of Comm'rs of Florida Inland Nay. Dist. v. Latham, 121 Fla.
486, 493, 163 So. 890, 893 (1935).
.'State ex rel. Ginsberg v. Dreka, 135 Fla. 463, 185 So. 616 (1938); note, how-
ever, the strong implication that not every road district would confer special benefits
upon district property.
"'State ex re. Clark v. Henderson, 137 Fla. 666, 188 So. 351 (1939). And yet,
while refusing to pay any of their share of expenses for free schools for their children,
citizens of this ilk have nevertheless managed to filch the right to vote to create bond-
ed debt that they themselves have no intention whatever of paying, Lersch v. Board
of Public Instruction, 121 Fla. 621, 164 So. 281 (1935).
"'Compare Crowder v. Philips, 146 Fla. 428, 442, 1 So.2d 629, 631 (1941), with,
e.g., State v. Walton County, 97 Fla. 59, 119 So. 865 (1929). For a general picture, see
the thorough analyses by Davis, J., in Jinkins v. Entzminger, 102 Fla. 167, 135 So.
785 (1931) (special and general benefits within taxing entity), and by Brown, C. J.,
in Lewis v. Leon County, 91 Fla. 118, 107 So. 146 (1926) (nature of county purpose,
constituting general benefit).
"'Cf., e.g., Peninsular Tel. Co. v. Clearwater, 39 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1949); Heriot v.
Pensacola, 108 Fla. 480, 146 So. 654 (1933), a scholarly summarization of the law
by Bird, Circ. J., sitting as associate justice. The distinction between excise and
license taxes roams beyond our discussion here.
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change in meaning has been a subject of debate. Attorney General Gibbs
thought that no difference resulted. 4 9 6 Mr. Justice Buford argued the
contrary view in his dissent in State ex rel. Clark v. Henderson.4 97 Mr.
Justice Whitfield, writing for the majority in the same case, preferred to
leave the issue undecided. 49 8 It is not likely that the judiciary will base
any major shift in the law upon this variance in terminology. Rather,
one can predict with considerable confidence that judicial classification
of any given levy as either a tax or an assessment, at least in so far as
our Legislature remains silent on the matter, 4 9 9 will swing on the primary
distinction first mentioned in this abbreviated discussion of assessments.
3. Who
A sharp divergence appears at this point between personalty and
realty. The claimant of the personalty tax exclusion must be "the head
of the family residing in this State . .... -50 Accordingly the analysis
in Part I supra5 0 1 applies here also. Technically, the owner of the realty
should file for the residence exclusion, while the family head should claim
the personalty exclusion.
In practice, however, some assessors prefer filing by the family head
as regards both exclusions, regardless of ownership by the other spouse.
Since the two normally live together, and only one residence exclusion
is allowed per dwelling house, the practical result is the same as far as
the residence is concerned. The necessity for careful differentiation is
further lessened by the statutory direction that tangible personalty be
assessed in the name of the husband as between man and wife, or of the
"'REP. ATi'y Ga. 438, 447 (1939).
...137 Fla. 666, 674, 188 So. 351, 355 (1939).
"'Id. at 670, 188 So. at 353.
"A recent example of legislative conversion of an assessment into a tax is Fla.
Laws 1949, c. 25214, §3, which imposes the Central and Southern Florida Flood Con-
trol District special tax on "all property subject to county taxes in said district . .."
Op. ATT'Y GEN. 049-310 (July 8, 1949) accordingly rules that the residence exclusion
applies. Inasmuch as floods have rarely, if ever, been known to bypass land merely
because there was a house on it, a clearer instance of special enhancement of the
value of realty within a given area would be difficult to discover; yet residences are
accorded favoritism even under these extreme conditions.
'"'FIA. CONST. Art. IX, §11.
50'2 U. or FLA. L. REV. 24-31 (1949). In particular, the inept draftsmanship that
produced the phrase "head of the family residing in this State" is subject to the ana-
lysis at pp. 30-31, as far as the personalty tax exclusion is concerned.
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family head whenever a family relation exists; but even so, a special re-
turn showing separate ownership can be filed, and the assessor is empower-
ed to split assessments in his discretion in any event.5 0 2 Careful atten-
tion to returns and the exclusions claimed is therefore indicated. In in-
stances of doubt, the local assessor should be consulted as to his practice.
Title. Section 7 begins with the words "Every person who has the
legal title or beneficial title in equity to real property in this State .... "
The property, then, must be located in Florida, and the claimant must
have legal or equitable title. Furthermore, by way of liberalization under
the 1938 amendment, "Said title may be held by the entireties, jointly, or
in common with others .... "503
Legal title of course includes fee simple title; and by statute it has
been extended so as to embrace, among holders of title, vendees in posses-
sion under purchase contracts appropriately recorded, and widows holding
by virtue of dower or of estates limited in time, provided the claimant
resides on the realty.50 4
A life tenant in residence can claim the exclusion. 50 5 Whether a
tenant for years under a will may do so is debatable. Unlike a life
tenant, he is not seised. But feudal distinctions in property law do not
necessarily govern taxation today. Logically, whenever taxes are collect-
ed from a resident in possession, he should be able to claim the exclusion;
this is undoubtedly the policy of Section 7. That the Supreme Court
r
0 2
FLA. STAT. §200.07 (1941). The family head is not necessarily a husband; cf.
2 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 24-29 (1949).
"'Even under the strict 1934 wording of Section 7 Attorney General Landis, in
REP. Arr'Y GEN. 71, 76 (1935), took the position that "title" embraces "an un-
divided interest in the land such as a tenancy in common .... " Indeed, he went
so far as to construe this word "to include any beneficial interest in land which may
be the homestead." The influence of the earlier sections of Article X is apparent in
this latter statement, although they significantly do not contain the word "title."
In any event, the proposition is too broad today; cf. note 506 infra.
'OIFLA. STAT. §192.13 (1941). Note, however, that today the widow receives either
absolute title or a life estate: dower and lesser estates do not apply to homestead
realty, FLA. STAT. §§731.23, 731.27, 731.34 (Cum. Supp. 1947); nor can it be devised
when the owner is survived by a widow or lineal descendants, FLA. STAT. §731.05 (Cum.
Supp, 1947); cf. 2 U. OF FLA. L. Rav. 58-59, 222-223 (1949). Cf. RE. ATf'Y GEN.
62 (1936). This opinion takes the view that as regards a widow, as well as a con-
ditional vendee, recordation of the deed or other instrument is required, although
§192.13 does not specifically prescribe this in the case of the widow.
&
0 5REP. ATr'v GEN. 62 (1936); the will or other instrument must be duly probated
or admitted to record in the county where the realty is located, however.
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will so rule when the issue arises, however, cannot be predicted with
certainty.
At this point, expansion of the word "title" stops. It does not extend
to the interest of a lessee, 50 6 even assuming that an ad valorem tax on
realty could be levied thereagainst; and it is apparent that a fortiori the
residence exclusion, unlike the forced sale exemption, 50 7 cannot be
stretched to cover interests of even lesser stature.
Equitable title differs from legal title principally in the respect that
it is not perfected at law, and accordingly may require the intervention of
a court of equity in order to become fully effective.5 0 8
Single Persomis. Any connection that the residence exclusion may on
occasion have with the family is today purely fortuitous. A single person
living alone can claim it; and this applies to a married woman if she has
legally established a domicile separate from that of her husband and owns
the property in question. 5 0 9 Mere living apart is not, of course, con-
clusive; the old common-law ghost of the identity of husband and wife
still stalks the corridors of our legal edifice, and vanishes only when
confronted with proof of intent on the part of the wife to live permanently
and for justifiable cause in a residence other than that of her husband. 510
In this event each, if otherwise qualified, can claim the full residence
exclusion.5 11
5 8A leasehold interest is not equitable ownership, REP. Arr' " GEr. 163 (1941);
447 (1939) ; the lessor still holds title to the property.
5'Cf. 2 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 32 (1949).
"'8REP. A-r'y GEN. 438, 447 (1939); TIFFANY, OUTLNES OF REAL Pa oPFR, c. 5
(1929); WALSH, A TREATiSE O N EQtrY §86 (1930).
5O
9REP. ATrr'y GEN. 193 (1947) ; 449 (1940) ; cf. 285 (1946) ; contrast 279 (1948).
...The assessor is faced with the practical difficulty of determining in each instance
whether a married female claimant has established a separate domicile in Florida, and
whether both spouses are claiming exclusions when entitled to only one.
8 1 1REP. A'r'y GEN. 449 (1940); contrast Barlow v. Barlow, 156 Fla. 458, 23 So.2d
723 (1945), and Tigertail Quarries, Inc. v. Ward, 154 Fla. 122, 16 So.2d 812 (1944),
with Herron v. Passailaigue, 92 Fla. 818, 110 So. 539 (1926), and Hunt v. Hunt, 61
Fla. 630, 54 So. 390 (1911). Cf. 2 U. or" FLA. L. REv. 30 (domicile), 24 (mere phy-
sical separation), 28 (legal separation, divorce, and desertion) (1949); Olsen v.
Simpson, 39 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1949) (divorced husband held family head because of
obligation to support children); but note that, although there can be only one head
per family in establishing the exemption from forced sale, there can be as many resi-
dence exclusions as there are individuals, including members of one family, with
separate domiciles. Family headship is not requisite to the residence exclusion.
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Successors in Interest. An heir otherwise entitled to the residence ex-
clusion can claim it as the equitable owner of realty in an undivided
estate.5 12 Executors of one dying in the first quarter of any given year
may claim the exclusion on or before April 1, provided the deceased could
have obtained it, and provided further that the deceased was not at the
time of his or her death a homesteader under Section 1 of Article X.513
If he was, the homestead realty is not a part of the estate, and the per-
sonal representative has no jurisdiction over it;514 the widow or the heir
should file the claim, not because of her or his residence on the property,
but rather by virtue of the fact that the deceased was entitled to the resi-
dence exclusion for such year.
By parity of reasoning, inasmuch as there are no homestead restrictions
on the right to bequeath personalty,5 15 the personal representatives of a
deceased family head should through April 1 be able to claim the $500 tax
exclusion on household goods and personal effects to which he was entitled
on the first of the preceding January.
Entrymen. Although the residence exclusion is governed by Florida
law, and the owner of federal patent lands "homesteaded" is not neces-
sarily entitled to it,516 an entryman under the Florida Statutes may claim
it.517 The material date is that on which he completes the statutory re-
quirements for obtaining a conveyance, regardless of whether he obtains
it in fact. On such date he becomes the equitable owner of the property;
and on the first of the following January he becomes liable to taxation
thereon, in all probability. In any event, his right to the residence exclu-
sion arises simultaneously with such liability.5 18 He can, of course, lose
this right later by failing to meet the residence requirements of Section 7,
even though he may remain the owner of the property and liable as such
for taxes. But to acquire the right to conveyance in the first place he




REP. AT'TY GEN. 198 (1943).
513REP. AT'TY GEN. 282 (1946); cf. FLA. STAT. §733.01 (Cum. Supp. 1947). As to
filing returns see notes 542, 545 infra.
514REP. AT'ey GusT. 283 (1946); cf. 2 U. or FLA. L. REV. 54-62, 222, 227-231 (1949).
515CJ. 2 U. op FLA. L. REv. 82-83 (1949).
516REP. ATT'Y Gm. 167 (1941).
3
17REP. A"rrY GEN. 365 (1948); cf. FLA. STAT. §253.35 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
5l8lbid. Cf. also Part V, 4 infra.
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Partners and Shareholders of Corporations. Neither a partnership
nor a corporation can be the head of a family. 5 19 Therefore, until the
1938 amendment became effective, neither could claim any residence
exclusion.5 20 Nor can either obtain the personalty tax exclusion even
today. As of January 1, 1939, however, the law was changed as to
realty; today a partner, it is submitted, can claim the residence exclusion
as the equitable owner of his share of partnership realty, provided he
meets the other requisites. 5 2 ' Attorney General Watson so advised in his
well-reasoned opinion of February 14, 1947,522 citing extensively pertin-
ent authorities from other jurisdictions. Furthermore, although in phras-
ing Section 7 it would have been a relatively simple matter to use legal
terminology and say "held by the entireties, by joint tenancy, or by ten-
ancy in common," the draftsmen chose instead to use the broader lay
language embracing any kind of co-holding.
From an economic standpoint there is no reason whatever for refusing
to extend this right of tax exclusion to shareholders of a non-profit,
mutual-ownership corporation, in which the shares of each represent his
ownership of his residence. Attorney General Landis was of this view,
even under Section 7 as originally adopted. 52 3 The contrary position
was taken more recently by Attorney General Watson. 5 2 4 The difficulty
with allowing the exemption lies in the fact that at law the very purpose
of a corporation is to insulate the shareholders as individuals; and equity
is loath to intrude so far as to disregard the corporate entity in favor of
one who deliberately adopts the corporate device.5 2 5 When he chooses
this glamorous creature of the law, he takes her with her vices as well as
her virtues. He owns a share of her -but she still owns the apartment.
That the earlier opinion accords economically with the spirit of Sec-
tion 7 is recognized; the residence of an individual becomes none the less
5 .Cf. 2 U. oF FLA. L. REV. 21 (1949). From the forced sale standpoint, individ-
ual exemptions cannot be advanced to evade payment of partnership debts prior to
bona fide dissolution. The term "beneficial title in equity" does not appear in Sec-
tion 1, however.
...REP. A'ry GEN. 71, 76 (1935).
5 'FLA. CONST. Art. IX, §11 does not mention title at all. The test, it is suggested,
is a simple one: if the household goods and personal effects are taxable to a family
head as "his," then they are "his" for tax exclusion purposes.
522REP. ATT'y GEN. 617 (1947).
REP. ATTY GEN. 61 (1936).
.2 REP. ATT'y GEN. 196 (1947).
...Cf. WORuMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FicTiON AND ALLIED CORPORATION
PROBLEMs 29 (1929), the outstanding treatise in this particular field.
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so merely because he cannot afford a plot of ground to go with it. Any
dogmatic prediction as to the outcome of this issue would be rash at
present, but the authors of this article incline toward the view that share-
holders, even of the type here considered, unfortunately do not come within
the purview of Section 7, even as broadened in 1938. By the same token,
amendment of Section 7 to include them is strongly indicated.
Citizenship. An alien is today on an equal footing with others in ap-
plying for the exclusions. Citizenship is not required for either the resi-
dence5 26 or the personalty exclusion. 5 27 The earlier decision in Steuart
v. State ex rel. Dolcimascolo,5 2 8 and indeed all opinions touching on the
residence exclusion prior to the 1938 amendment, are accordingly matters
of legal history from the citizenship aspect.
Residence. The problem of residence is a knotty one. Nowhere does
Section 7 as amended require the claimant to be a Florida resident, unless
a substantial clause be eliminated as meaningless. To be sure, the prop-
erty must be located in Florida. But the words defining the claimant
as an owner "who resides thereon and in good faith makes the same his
or her permanent home, or the permanent home of another or others legal-
ly or naturally dependent upon said person.. ." is an excellent illustration
of the familiar debating maxim that too much is seldom enough. If he
must reside thereon in any event, the reference to "permanent home of
another or others" means precisely nothing; and courts are reluctant to
make this assumption if it can possibly be avoided.
5 2 9
On the other hand, if these words are to be accorded significance, the
terminology "resides thereon and in good faith" becomes superfluous: he
cannot possibly make the property his permanent home without residing
52
4FLA. COasT. Art. X, §7, as amended in 1938, Smith v. Voight, 158 Fla. 366, 28
So.2d 426 (1946). Nor need the claimant be a registered voter, OP. ATr' Gm. 049-
192" (May 4, 1949), although in practice registration is highly desirable both as an aid
to the assessor and as a strong evidentiary fact for the resident. So also is the sworn
statement of domicile provided for in FLA. STAT. §222.17 (1941).5270P. ATr'Y GEN. 049-356 (Aug. 1, 1949). FLA. CoNsT. Art. IX, §11, never has
prescribed citizenship.
'2'119 Fla. 117, 161 So. 378 (1935). Needless to say, the decision was correct
when rendered.
5 20See, e.g., Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 54, 59 So. 963, 968 (1912) ; State v.
Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 385, 39 So. 929, 958 (1905). Admittedly, the draftsmanship is
on occasion so faulty that the words convey no thought at all; ci., e.g., Miller v.
Phillips, 157 Fla. 175, 25 So.2d 194 (1946).
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thereon; and if he physically occupies the premises in bad faith his pre-
sence is nugatory and deceives no one but himself. It is submitted that
this language was intended to mean "who makes it his or her domicile or
that of a legal or natural dependent ... " Attorney General Gibbs has
ruled that the owner of a residence in one county, if he maintains depend-
ents of his therein on a permanent basis, can obtain the residence ex-
clusion thereon even though he votes as a resident of another Florida
county, provided he limits himself to the one claim. 53 0
This same opinion avoids meeting squarely a query propounded as to
whether the claimant can under some circumstances be a citizen and
therefore a resident of another state.5 3 1 Section 7 unequivocally permits
this, albeit perhaps unwittingly, unless the claimant must himself reside
on the property. This latter construction, however, has already been
shown to render "permanent home of another" meaningless. The only
logical conclusion is, therefore, that he can reside outside Florida pro-
vided he holds legal or equitable title to realty in Florida and makes it the
permanent home of one or more of his dependents.
The words "legally or naturally dependent" are but a synonym for
members of a family at law or a family in fact. This concept has been
analyzed in Part I, 2 supra;53 2 and that discussion is applicable here,
though with less emphasis on communal living in instances of those "moral-
ly dependent." There must of course be necessity for support and some
basis for a claim thereto or expectancy thereof. 5 33 Since, however, family
headship is not required by Section 7, its existence is merely strong evi-
dence of dependency rather than a necessary factor.
There is, or was, still another ambiguity: Were the words "resides
thereon" inserted, in addition to the term "permanent home," with the
thought of compelling continuous physical presence of the claimant on
the property? The Supreme Court recently answered this question in
the negative.
53 4
Residence is first established by physical presence on the property,
"3 REP. Air"y Gmr. 438, 445-446 (1939).
..1Id. at 443. "Resident" is defined in Fr.A. STAT. §192.14 (1941).
5322 U. or FILA. L. REV. 24 (1949).
'Cf. REP. AT'ry GEN. 438, 446 (1939), aptly quoting the definition of a depend-
ent given in Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 100-101, 15 So. 876, 881 (1894). A conclusion
of fact, such as this always is, is notoriously difficult to formulate with exactitude
until the basic evidentiary facts are presented.
"36Jacksonville v. Bailey, 159 Fla. 11, 30 So.2d 529 (1947). This matter is dis-
cussed under Abandonment in Part V, 4 infra.
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coupled with the intent at the time not to reside permanently or indefi-
nitely elsewhere. 53 5 The Attorney General was recently asked to give his
opinion on the legal result when such intent is manifest but the law rela-
ting to rent control prevents the purchaser from entering by January 1.536
He advised, quite logically, that inability to take possession, when thus
occasioned by "the sovereign aided by the act of the public enemy," 53 7
is immaterial; in other words, factual absence compelled by law is never-
theless legal presence.
4. When
It is not the purpose of this article even to raise, much less to analyze,
the various general problems in the broad field of liability to and exemp-
tion from taxation by Florida of real or personal property at state, coun-
ty and municipal levels. Only to the extent that the residence and per-
sonalty tax exclusions overlap them will they be considered. In dealing
with the time element, however, it is helpful to bear in mind a few gen-
eral rules that can be concisely formulated.
The State of Florida, after the calendar year 1940, has been expressly
forbidden to levy any ad valorem tax either upon realty or upon personalty
other than intangibles. 5 38 Ad valorem taxation of realty and tangible
personalty is thus reserved to the counties and municipalities. 5 3 9
All property is taxable on January 1, and the tax is a lien thereon.5 40
Realty is separately assessed as of this date.5 4 ' Returns must be filed
by every owner or person in control of the property on or before April 1;
and, if these are not filed by then, the assessor thereafter determines the
valuation. 5 42 Taxes are due on November 1, or as soon thereafter as
...CJ. 2 U. or FLA. L. Rav. 30 (1949); Op. Azr'vf Gm. 049-432 (Sept. 12, 1949).
"38'P. An'vr GEN. 195 (1947).
..SId. at 196.
... F.A. CONsr. Art. IX, §2. For a thorough exposition of our intangible tax see
Legis., 2 U. or FLA. L. Rav. 262 (1949).
"",Cf. FrA. CoNsr. Art. IX, §5, and the authorization by the Legislature therein
directed.
5'°FLA. STAT. §§192.04 (1941), 200.02 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"Fr.A. STAT. §193.11 (Cum. Supp. 1947); cf. §192.04 (1941); Simpson v. Birh-
berg, 159 Fla. 25, 30 So.2d 912 (1947); REP. A'ey GEN. 284 (1946).
"'2FLA. STAT. §193.12 (1941). Although annual filing of a return as to realty may
not be customary among homeowners, there are legal dangers involved; cf. Adams v.
Fielding, 148 Fla. 552, 4 So.2d 678 (1941) (alternative holding). Most resident
owners can in practice, however, and do trust their local assessor to set the valuations
of their residences. See also note 545 infra.
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the assessment roll comes into the hands of the tax collector, and may be
paid at any subsequent time through March 31 of the following year at
progressively decreasing discounts starting at four percent in November
and reaching zero in March. 5 43 If not paid they become delinquent on
April 1.5 4 4
The same dates and requirements apply to taxes on tangible person-
alty,5 4 5 with the exception, to some extent, of the time controlling the
assessment. All property, both real and personal, is specifically made
subject to taxation on January 1.546 But whereas Florida realty is al-
ways here then, regardless of its owner, personalty may well be elsewhere
and yet arrive in Florida within the year. The material time for liability
to taxation of tangible personal property in each county extends between
January 1 and March 1; 5 47 therefore it seems logical that personalty al-
ready in a given county on January 1 should be assessed as of that date,
while personalty entering between January 1 and March 1, inclusive,
should be assessed, as a practical matter, on an "average" basis. 54 8
The tax chameleons are born each year, if at all. The old refrain
"once a homestead, always a homestead," which is misleading even as to
forced sale, 5 49 is the exact opposite of the truth from the standpoint of
the tax exclusion. Each year requires a separate and distinct determin-
ation, on the basis of the facts as they then exist.
Filing date. Applications for either exclusion must be made by the
13 FLA. STAT. §193.41 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
5"Ibid. The law governing current tax sales for delinquency is summarized in
Legis., 2 U. oF FLA. L. REV. 273 (1949).
515Cf. FLA. STAT. §§193.12 (1941), 192.57, 200.08 (Cum. Supp. 1947) (returns
generally); 193.41 (Cum. Supp. 1947), 200.25, 200.26 (1941) (date due and dis-
counts); 193.41 (Cum. Supp. 1947), 200.27 (1941) (delinquency); 200.18 (1941)
(list by judge of county judge's court) ; 200.17 (1941) (return by court clerk, receiver
or custodian).
... FLA. STAT. §193.04 (1947).
""FLA. STAT. §§200.13 (1941), 193.11 (Cum. Supp. 1947). The words "between
January first and March first" apparently are meant to include both these dates in
§200.13. Both statutes were approved by the Governor on June 7, 1941, and both
were filed with the Secretary of State on June 9. The latter was amended in 1943
without clearing up the ambiguity produced- by the two when read together. Cf.
Lee Cypress Co. v. Hendry, 155 Fla. 757, 21 So.2d 351 (1945) ; REP. A'r'v GEN'. 232
(1947).
"'Administratively, it is practically impossible to inventory and assess the person-
alty of a new resident on the very day he arrives.
5'Cf. 2 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 35 (1949).
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taxpayer on or before April 1.5 50 Furthermore, they must be filed each
year; failure to do so constitutes automatic waiver of all rights for the
year in question.5 5 1 Doubt as to the power of the Legislature to set the
time and manner of filing, and to deny the residence exclusion upon failure
to comply with these requirements, was expressed recently in Jacksonville
v. Bailey;5 5 2 but the statement is mere dictum, and fails to take account
either of the practical necessity for determining with finality the total
amount of assessed valuation to be excluded before fixing the annual
millage rates on the remainder, or of the language in Section 7 specifically
authorizing the Legislature to "prescribe appropriate and reasonable
laws regulating the manner of establishing the right to said exemption."
The residence exclusion requires a separate application, while the per-
sonalty exclusion must be claimed by the family head on his personal
property return. 55 3 This April 1 deadline cannot be extended, even by
the county commissioners, except in those rare instances in which waiver
by the party entitled to exemption is impossible.
5 5 4
A claim for residence exclusion, when properly filed with the county
tax assessor, covers municipal as well as county taxes without further
action.5 5 5 It is submitted that the results of application need not be the
same, however; the municipality is not bound by county determination
ORE. Arr'Ty G x. 448 (1939) ; 522 (1937) ; 71, 81 (1935). Part V, 5 infra explains
where claims should be filed. The form to be used is detailed in FLA. STAT. §192.15
(1941).
"
1FxA. STAT. §§192.16 (Cum. Supp. 1947) (realty), 200.15 (1941) (personalty).
.5159 Fla. 11, 13, 30 So.2d 529, 530 (1947).
FLA. STAT. §§192.16 (realty), 200.15 (personalty) (1941).
"'REP. Arr'ly Gmr. 287 (1946); cf. 197 (1944) (pointing out that the filing pro-
visions of the statute do not excuse widows, war veterans, cripples or the blind);
448 (1939). The 1946 opinion takes the position that an insane person is incapable
of waiver; the view seems sound unless a guardian has been appointed. Cf. also
REP. ATr'v GEN. 194 (1948). Both the 1946 and 1939 opinions recognize that late
filing may possibly be justified under exceptional circumstances, which, however,
must arise before they can be specifically considered. The wisdom of this caveat was
demonstrated during World War II. J. N. Lummus, Jr., tax assessor of Dade County
and former president of the National Association of Assessing Officers, proposed to
go to the extensive extra labor of rechecking residences of servicemen with a view to
forestalling automatic waiver of tax exclusion by the absent owners. The American
Legion was equally active. These efforts met with the approval and commendation
of Attorney General Watson, REP. ATr'y GEx. 199 (1943); 166 (1942). Cf. Fla.
Laws 1943, c. 21880, FLA. STAT. §192.55 (Cum. Supp. 1947), now expired.
5srFrA. STAT. §§167.72 (Cum. Supp. 1947), 192.18 (1941).
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as regards its own assessments, even though it may choose to adopt the
county figures. 5 5 6
Governing Date. Unlike the forced sale exemptions, the right to
either exclusion is set on a specific date each year. In general, the same
reasoning applies to both tax exclusions.
Subjection to taxation and assessment of the residence are fixed as of
January 1 in each year; and the logical implications of the mandate have
been consistently followed by the Attorney General in ruling on the right
to the residence exclusion. 5 5 7 The owner of realty on January 1 is entitled
to the exclusion if otherwise qualified, even though he moved to Florida
late in the preceding fall.558 If he sells or abandons the property after
the first of the year, his basis of claim still exists; 5 5 9 and, as has al-
ready been noted, his widow, heir, executor or administrator, as the case
may be, is allowed to file the claim on or before April 1 if he dies on or
after January 1 and prior to the deadline for submitting the application. 5 60
By the same token, one who meets the ownership and residence require-
ments throughout most of the year, yet not on January 1, is not entitled
to the exclusion. 5 61 The reason underlying this is readily apparent: the
5'eREP. ATT'y GEN. 199 (1943); ci. FLA. CONST. Art. IX, §5, directing municipali-
ties to "make their own assessments"; FLA. STAT. §167.44 (1941); Vassar v. Arnold,
154 Fla. 757, 18 So.2d 906 (1944) (special law forcing adoption by city of county
tax roll held unconstitutional); Holman v. Fort Pierce, 154 Fla. 743, 19 So.2d 58
(1944) (assessment of same lot by county at $500 and by city at $905 approved);
Bradenton v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 100 Fla. 606, 130 So. 21 (1930).
.5 REP. ATT'y GE . 284 (1946); 288 (1945); 162 (1941); 71, 79 (1935); cf. the
ruling that lands conveyed after January 1 by Murphy Act deed from the state are
not taxable in that year, REP. A'r'Y GEN. 276 (1946). Since Simpson v. Hirshberg,
159 Fla. 25, 30 So.2d 912 (1947), there should be no further doubts.
"SREP. Ai-'y GEN. 162 (1941).
65REP. ATr'y GEN. 288 (1945). Of course, only one residence can be claimed;
and the mere fact that an individual is physically in a given building on January 1
does not necessarily make it his residence. A subterfuge will not suffice.
"'See Successors in Interest, Part V, 3 supra.
11Rx,.Ep. Arr'y GEN. 284 (1946).. Let us assume that A, who resides on his property
on January 1, sells it to B on March 15, and establishes another domicile elsewhere
in Florida. B immediately makes this property his home, and claims the residence
exclusion thereon. Two matters are beyond -doubt: (1) A can claim the exclusion
up to the time of sale, since he can file at any time on or before April 1; and (2)
neither A nor B is entitled to the exclusion on his new residence, because neither
resided there on January 1. But can A file claim for exclusion on his January 1
residence on, say, March 20? He no longer owns the property. Yet these taxes are
a lien on the property as of January 1, according to F.A. STAT. §192.04 (1941). At-
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taxes are assessed as of January 1; and, regardless of arrangements be-
tween the parties involved as to who is to pay them in fact for any given
year, the residence or non-residence character of the property, its valua-
tion, and the right to the exclusion all relate to the first day of the
year.5 6
2
Turning to personalty, the date on which it should be assessed for tax
purposes may perhaps be debatable in theory; 563 but one thing is certain,
namely, that the right to the exclusion, in those instances in which it can
be advanced at all, arises simultaneously with liability to taxation. As to
this, the mandate of our Constitution is unequivocal: "there shall be
exempt from taxation to the head of the family residing in this State,
household goods and personal effect [sic] .. ." to the value of $500.564
Abandonment. It is now settled that continuous physical presence on
the property is not a prerequisite to securing the residence exclusion. In
Jacksonville v. Bailey5 65 the owner was successful in his claim, even
though he and his family had moved out of their home and had rented it
for approximately three months, including the first of January, during the
so-called winter season. He had been residing on the property for several
years; did not claim any other home; removed from the premises his
necessary personal belongings only; and moved back as soon as his tenants
had departed. In other words, Bailey never abandoned his residence.
Of the various indicia of permanent residence or domicile previously
torney General Watson has ruled that A can file under these circumstances, REaP.
ATr'y Gmz. 288 (1945), even though A does not hold the legal or equitable title sped-
fled in Art. X, §7. But on what does A on March 20 base his authority to enter a
claim, as distinct from the conditions requisite to its creation? What connection does
be then have with the title? The answer is not free from doubt; accordingly A
should as a practical matter file his claim prior to the sale, even though it be con-
summated on the first business day of the year. B should insist upon this at the
time; and the saving in taxes can be apportioned between A and B on the basis of
whatever bargain they choose to make.
362lbid.
"See notes 547, 548 supra.
"'6Fr. CONST. Art. IX, §11.
"M159 Fla. 11, 30 So.2d 529 (1947). For many years the Attorney General accur-
ately anticipated this very decision; e.g., REP. ATr'y GFN. 286 (1946); 438, 446-447
(1939); 71, 78 (1935). Note the sharp analysis of the converse situation in REP.
A r r GN. 164 (1941). Cf. the middle position in REP. AT'y GEr. 279 (1948)
(absence without rental regarded as not conclusive of abandonment); 194 (1948)
(insane person in institution held incapable of abandoning his homestead property).
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discussed,5 6 6 presence is but one, the relative force of which varies with
the nature and length of any absence. The determination of residence
is a conclusion of fact, reached in each instance by weighing the relevant
evidentiary facts of record in the light of the principle that under the
law of any given jurisdiction, including Florida, an individual must have
one, but only one, permanent residence. Both abandonment of the home-
stead, resulting in loss of the forced sale exemption, and abandonment of
the residence, so as to destroy the right to the tax exclusion, rest on the
same basis.
5 6 7
It follows as a corollary that the conclusion of fact to be drawn from
absence as an evidentiary fact varies directly with another evidentiary
fact, namely, the calling of the claimant. This is especially true when
such calling is military service. Never does the law operate more drastical-
ly than when it requires an individual, more recently even in time of peace,
to leave his home and sacrifice for the communal benefit several valuable
years of his life, or perhaps life itself, at a wage-ceiling not tolerated in
other employment. Yet the smuggest of civilians concede that even a man
in the armed forces is entitled to a permanent residence somewhere, and
that it does not shift from ship to ship or from beachhead to beachhead.
The community that sends him out, and that refuses to allow his family
even the minimum of subsistence in an invariably rising market while he
is away, can hardly complain taxwise when as a direct result he has to
rent his home in order to keep his family alive. This has been recognized,
in the main, in several opinions: the distinction is in full accord with the
law of domicile when one becomes familiar with it, and no special cate-
gory is created; absences "on business" are merely longer when one is
on military duty, and do not per se constitute abandonment of the one
domicile he must have.5 6 8 He may, however, establish a new domicile
at his station, thereby abandoning his former one.
5662 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 29-31, 37-40 (1949); cf. FLA. STAT. §192.14 (1941). Func-
tional abandonment as related to the residence exclusion, that is, the use of a portion
of the residence, without departing therefrom, for purposes of rental income, is treat-
ed in Urban Realty, Part V, 6 infra.
'See notes 565, 566 supra; compare Jacksonville v. Bailey, 159 Fla. 11, 30 So.2d
529 (1947), with Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So.2d 443 (1942).
5 'Attorney General Ervin's opinion 049-188 (April 29, 1949) covers the law
admirably; cf. REP. Air'y GEN. 620 (1947). The dangers of a casual approach to
domicile are strikingly illustrated in REP. ATT'Y GFN. 524 (1940). Correction was
soon made in a thorough analysis by Attorney General Watson, REP. Arr'y GE. 165
(1941) ; see also note 554 supra. Re-enlistment is dealt with in REP. AT-r'y GEN. 284
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5. Where
Claim for the residence exclusion must be filed with the county tax
assessor in a form substantially as set forth in the statute.5 69 Oath is not
required; but making or subscribing an application that one knows or has
reason to know is false as to any material matter constitutes a misde-
meanor.5
70
Realty is separately assessed by both the county and city where
situated; 5 71 consequently the application for exclusion should be filed
with the assessor of the county in which the property is located. The per-
sonalty tax exclusion should be similarly claimed, since it must be listed
on the tangible personalty return.5 7 2 As a practical matter, of course,
most household goods and personal effects are kept in the residence;
accordingly no problem will normally arise in choosing the proper county
to the extent of the $500 exclusion.
All claims for residence exclusion duly filed with the county tax
assessor are deemed to have been filed for municipal tax purposes also; 5 7 3
in other words, only one filing is now necessary, but by the same token
failure to file properly costs the claimant his exclusion as regards both
county and municipal realty taxes. City assessors are governed by the
provisions of the laws relating to the residence exclusion. 5 74 It follows
logically, although the matter may perhaps be debatable, that the city
assessor is not bound by the action of the county assessor in granting or
denying a claim duly presented, and should make his own decision, even
though in practice it may well accord with that of the county assessor. 5
73
(1946), but the facts here resulted in a treatment too cursory to be of much general
value. As for absence on business, see 2 U. or FLA. L. Rv. 37-40 (1949).
"OFLA. STAT. §192.15 (1941). The use of the present tense in the form does not,
however, shift the date as of which the right to exclusion is fixed from January 1 to
any date on or before April 1 that the claimant happens to select for filing, REP.
Az'rTy GENr. 288 (1945); see Governing Date, Part V, 4 supra;
7FLA STAT. §192.57 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
5"71FLA. STAT. §193.06 (1941); see note 573 infra.
¢Frt. STAT. §§209.09, 200.15 (1941) ; cf. 193.12 (1941) as regards returns. As to
oath, contrast the contradictory §§192-57(1) and 200.08(1) (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"'FLA. STAT. §167.72 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
574FLA. STAT. §192.18 (1941).
1T7 rhis reasoning is predicated on FLA. STAT. §192.18 (1941) and the analogous
authorities cited in note 556 supra. An adverse ruling by the city assessor can ap-
parently be tested before the county commissioners in accordance with FLA. STAT.
§192.19 (1941), and in any event in the circuit court.
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6. On What
The taxable base, from the assessed valuation of which the residence
exclusion of Section 7 is deducted, is described as "the said home and con-
tiguous real property, as defined in Article 10 [sic], Section 1 . . . ." For
this reason the discussion in Part I, 5 supra5 7 6 is in the main applicable
here, except that for tax exclusion purposes the realty unquestionably
must be contiguous to the residence. The physical limits set forth in
Section 1 are applied in Section 7 by specific reference thereto.
The realty includes new buildings constructed by each January 1; the
cum onere doctrine applies equally to taxation and exclusion.
5 77  It
should be noted in passing that a houseboat is personalty, unless so at-
tached to the land as to become a house rather than a boat. 5 7 8
Rural Realty. The residence to be valued and assessed, when outside
the limits of an incorporated city or town, extends to a maximum of 160
acres, "together with ... the improvements on the real estate . . .-.
This means all improvements, of whatever nature.5 80 For example, a
fishing camp, including cottages rented out, is part of the taxable base
from which the exclusion is deducted, if on the rural property on which
the residence of the owner is located. 5 8 1
It should also be noted at this point that Section 5 of Article X ap-
plies, as one would normally suppose, to the entire article, including Sec-
tion 7;582 no rural "homestead provided for in section one shall be re-
duced in area on account of its being subsequently included within the
limits of an incorporated city or town, without the consent of the owner."
The only question of importance that arises here is this: Can a mere resi-
dence, the owner of which is entitled to the exclusion under Section 7, be
reduced in area upon inclusion within a municipality, when its owner is
not the head of a family residing in Florida and when, therefore, it is not
a "homestead provided for in section one"? The answer, it is suggested,
"2 U. oF FLA. L. Rv. 40-52 (1949).
5
7"RFP. A'rr'y GEN. 71, 82 (1935); cf. Yowell v. Rogers, 128 Fla. 881, 175 So. 772
(1937).
...FLA. STAT. §200.01 (1941), REP. A-rT'y GEN. 195 (1948); cf. FLA. STAT. §200.44
(Cure. Supp. 1947).7 9From FI.A. CONST. Art. X, §1, incorporated by reference in §7.
1
8 0REp. Airr'y GEN. 619 (1947); 71, 75 (1935).
58'RFP. Arr'y GEi. 777 (1946).
882REp. Arr'y GEN. 264 (1946); 240 (1944); 164 (1942); 787 (1935).
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is yes; if the property does not qualify as homestead under Section 1,
then Section 5 cannot come into play at all, by its very terms. Any change
in -Section 5, if desired, could readily have been effected along with the
amendment adding Section 7.
Urban Realty. A residence inside a municipality not only embraces no
more than a half-acre, but it is also limited, by the definition incorporated
from Section 1, to "the residence and business house of the owner"; ac-
cordingly our realty tax chameleon finds himself in the same varicolored
labyrinth in which his bewildered brother, the forced sale chameleon, has
so often run for the laboratory technicians of the law.
Speaking very generally, however, he has discovered somewhat differ-
ent paths, with the result that his color-transmutations have not been so
marked. The swift-footed shade of Achilles Mabry, dissenting in Smith
v. Guckenheimer & Sons,583 which in McEwen v. Larson5s 4 caught the
hapless Hector of Cowdery v. Herring,58 5 has to date failed to overtake
the- brother.5 8 6 Young Anolis carolinensis Fiscus is still moving well.
Perhaps, indeed, this is because he has merely been playing about in the
office of the Attorney General rather than running three - or more -
times 'round the walls of the Supreme Court Building; but his more ad-
vantageous route was not open to his brother. 'The natural reluctance to
render judgment-proof the owner of a large hotel or apartment house
5 8 7
is virtually eliminated in our tax law by the $5,000 limit; and, probably
:8342 Fla. 1, 42, 27 So. 900, 902 (1900).
B"136 Fla. 1, 185 So. 866 (1939).
"'5106 Fla. 567, 143 So. 433 (1932), affd on rehearing, 106 Fla. 574, 144 So. 348
(1932), though on rather confused reasoning. The chase is described in 2 U. op Fr.
L. REv. 40-47 (1949).
se REP. ATr'y Grs. 286 (1946) (large dwelling, presumably urban, rented in part
as apartments and rooms by resident owner, held exempt); 281 (1945) (urban hotel,
operated by resident owner, held exempt); 163 (1941) (tourist camp, houses rented
out, and apartment house all held exempt if on urban half-acre resided on, even though
claimant occupies another house); 438, 445 (1939) (any rental properties on half-
acre held exempt if rents furnish livelihood); 71, 73-74 (1935) (urban hotel, even
if not operated by resident owner, apartment house, separate dwelling houses, as well
as portions of business building rented out, held exempt, provided these and residence
of owner are all on the half-acre and the rents are used for livelihood).
"8'Florida is in the minority, even as regards the nationally widespread exemption
of realty from forced sale, in providing no valuation limit on the property; over half
the states set this at $2,500 or less. Cf. 2 U. or FLA. L. REv. 13-14 (1949). A brief but
forceful criticism appears in Pollitt, The Defeat of Justice, 23 FLA. L. J. 118, 129
(1949).
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more for this reason than any other, the Attorney General has consistently
recognized what is common knowledge to all lay Floridians and to most
lawyers, namely, that renting to tourists is very definitely a business in
Florida, and that it requires a "business house" in the form of apartments,
cabins, or some other type of lodging.
The earlier opinions probably went too far in extending the exclu-
sion to embrace rental properties that are a mere sideline rather than the
principal business of the owner; 58 8 but the later view 58 9 has the decided
merit of recognizing that renting, when it is one's business in fact, should
constitute one's business at law. The paths of our forced sale and resi-
dence exclusion chameleons diverge sharply at this point; but the misstep,
it is submitted, lies not in the tax opinions of the Attorney General, but
rather in the still unexplained overruling of the realistic doctrine of Cow-
dery v. Herring5 90 propounded by Mr. Justice Davis in connection with
forced sale.
Contiguity. Section 7 specifically says "the said home and contiguous
real property . . . ." Contiguity is therefore a prerequisite. But the matter
is not so easily dismissed. If contiguity is destroyed by operation of
law, what then? An early opinion 5 9 1 transferred the ratio decidendi of
Clark v. Cox592 into tax exclusion law by eliminating contiguity as a
requisite in instances of transection of a rural tract by roads. Two years
later, however, the owner of three urban lots, separated by a public street
in existence at the time he purchased them, applied for a tax exclusion
embracing all three. The Attorney General advised that the exclusion
base was confined to the residence and could not stretch across the
street.
5 9 3
Both opinions can be reconciled by careful analysis of Clark v. Cox.
The same principle that prevents abandonment by an insane owner placed
in an asylum, or by a military man forced to leave his home "on business,"
Sg.g., REP. ATrr'y GEN. 163 (1941).
.8 9Notably REP. ATr'y GEN. 281 (1945).
. 9 See note 585 supra. The Supreme Court might declare any rented property
subject to tax; see Yowell v. Rogers, 128 Fla. 881, 883, 175 So. 772, 773 (1937).
But cf. Jacksonville v. Bailey, 159 Fla. 11, 30 So.2d 529 (1947).
691REP. Aii"y GEN. 71, 75 (1935). This interpretation of Clark v. Cox extends
the principle beyond the facts giving birth to it; in any event, contiguity was not
specifically required until the subsequent amendment of 1938.
...80 Fla. 63, 85 So. 173 (1920), analyzed supra, 2 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 50 (1949).
...REP. ATr'y GEN. 523 (1937). This view gains support from the requirement
of contiguity in State ex rel. Dunscombe v. Courson, 144 Fla. 439, 198 So. 108 (1940).
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should produce a similar result when the community splits the property by
eminent domain. But when the separation is caused by the owner himself
or already exists upon his acquisition of the parcels, the contiguity speci-
fied in Section 7 should be strictly observed. 5 9 4 Today the law govern-
ing both the forced sale exemption of homestead realty and the residence
exclusion from taxation is the same in respect of contiguity.
Homestead Personalty. The $500 tax exclusion is confined to the
household goods and personal effects of the family head. It has no appli-
cation to intangibles, nor does it cover all tangibles; the broad scope ac-
corded the exemption of $1,000 of personalty from forced sale is con-
siderably limited in the tax field.5 9 5 The household goods and personal




Section 7 flatly prescribes a maximum residence exclusion of $5,000
per person. This provision is clear, and needs no discussion. But unfor-
tunately the other limits are not well delineated. The chief difficulty
springs from the conglomeration of terms used: "real property" owned by
one "who resides thereon"; "permanent home"; "the said home and
contiguous real property, as defined in Article 10, Section 1"; and ulti-
mately, "dwelling house." Why were all these varying designations used
if they all mean the same thing; and if they do not, what distinctions were
intended?
Just to liven matters up a bit, the ancestor of the present limiting pro-
vision 5 9 7 employed the term "any single parcel of real property" where
the words "any one dwelling house" now stand, while the original Section
7 used the single phrase "homestead as defined in Article X" in lieu of the
luxuriant verbiage listed above. Again, Section 7 now permits co-holding
of the title, with the proviso that:
".... no such exemption of more than Five Thousand Dollars shall
"'Cf. 2 U. oF FLA. L. Rxv. 47-52 (1949).
... Hackney v. McKenny, 113 Fla. 176, 151 So. 524 (1933); Tarpon Springs v.
Chrysostomides, 108 Fla. 500, 146 So. 845 (1933); cf. 2 U. oF FLA. L. REa. 77-78
(1949) as regards personalty exempt from forced sale. See also note 501 supra.
Hackney v. McKenny, supra note 595.
"'
TFla. Laws 1935, c. 17060, §2, now, as modified, FLA. STAT. §192.12 (1941).
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be allowed to any one person or any one dwelling house, nor shall
the amount of the exemption allowed any person exceed the pro-
portionate assessed valuation based on the interest owned by such
person."
Assessed valuation of what? Of the dwelling house? Of the home and
contiguous real property? Or of the entire parcel?
Assume a rural tract of 160 acres, owned in equal, undivided shares
by four tenants in common, and assessed at $40,000. On the property are
four dwelling houses: two of the co-owners reside there, each in a separate
house; the third, who lives in a hotel, supports his aged parents in the
third house, and claims a residence exclusion thereon; while the fourth
resides in a nearby town and rents the remaining dwelling house to tenants.
The interest of each co-owner being one-fourth, his proportionate share
of the assessed valuation is $10,000. The fourth co-owner cannot claim
any residence exclusion; but this fact has no influence whatever on the
proportionate shares of the other three. None of them is entitled to an
exclusion of more than $5,000, of course; nor can any of the four dwell-
ing houses be allocated an exclusion of more than $5,000.
The problem then is: Can each of the two resident co-owners, as well
as the co-owner supporting his dependent parents in the third house, ob-
tain an exclusion of $5,000, which of course does not exceed his $10,000
share of the assessed valuation; or does the $5,000 maximum relate to the
entire tract, in which event each co-owner is limited to one-fourth of such
amount, or $1,250? Viewed from another angle, does "the said home and
contiguous real property" signify each "home" or "dwelling house," or does
it mean the entire "single parcel of real property" as statutorily prescribed
in 1935 but now altered to read "any one dwelling house" in accordance
with the current Section 7?
The phrase "single parcel of real property" was quite properly relied
upon in an early 1936 opinion5 98 relating to a co-operative apartment
governed by the original Section 7 and supplementary statutes. In a gen-
eral survey opinion following the 1938 amendment the same answer was
given, 5 99 although the significance of the change from "single parcel of
real property" and "homestead as defined in Article X" to "any one
dwelling house" was completely overlooked. Several years later, the At-
torney General was specifically asked how much could be claimed by each
598R:P. AiT'e" Gg. 61 (1936).
31"REP. Alry GEN. 438, 444 (1939).
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of several partners, living in separate dwellings on a tract of land owned
by them. His reply advised that: 60 0
"... each partner may claim... a value up to five thousand dollars
but not in excess of the value of the interest of the owner."
Applying this answer to our hypothetical case, each of the three co-owners
residing on the property, since the value of his interest is $10,000, is en-
titled to the full $5,000 residence exclusion. By the same reasoning, if
the value of the tract were $16,000, each of the three would have an in-
terest of $4,000, and consequently could not obtain a $5,000 exclusion;
but he could get one of $4,000 as contrasted with a mere $1,250.
The distinct concepts of amount to be allowed, as against the right to
any exclusion at all, must be viewed separately. Unless the property be
the residence either of the owner or of his moral or legal dependents, no
exclusion may be claimed, as pointed out in Part V, 3 supra. This applies
to co-owners as well as to a sole owner. The first question to ask, of course,
is: What is the share of each co-owner in the ownership? The second
question then is: Does any co-owner fail to make the property his resi-
dence or that of his dependents? If he does not qualify, his share is com-
pletely eliminated as a basis for any exclusion. He cannot claim one him-
self; neither can he pass along his share of the ownership to another co-
owner as a ground for exclusion. If none of the co-owners qualifies, no
residence exclusion is available at all. Each must comply with one of the
two residence requirements as a separate individual; and each is confined
to an exclusion computed on the basis of his share only. The third ques-
tion then arises: How much can be claimed by each of those co-owners
meeting either or both of the residence tests?
Returning to this problem and our hypothetical case, not every Florida
assessor would grant an exclusion iV excess of $1,250 to the three co-own-
ers fulfilling one of the residence requirements. To be sure, our analysis
thus far accords with the phraseology of Section 7; and in particular the
argument can soundly be advanced that, had the framers intended to
limit to $5,000 the total of the exclusions to be allowed partial owners of
any realty jointly owned, or to restrict the percentage of the $5,000 "ex-
emption" allowed each partial owner to his share of the ownership, they
could easily have said so. The fact is that they did not. Instead, the
limit was specifically set at his share of the assessed valuation - not of the
exclusion.
...REP. Arr'Yt GEa. 617, 619 (1947). This opinion presents a very able analysis.
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Furthermore, since the total of the exclusions as regards any tract
obviously can never exceed the taxable base from which they are de-
ducted, 6 01 and since this base is always the assessed valuation, therefore,
if confinement to a share of one overall exclusion was intended, there was
no point whatever in imposing the superfluous limitation to a proportion-
ate share of the assessed valuation. The limit would have been auto-
matic at $5,000 or any lesser valuation anyhow. At the same time, it is
fundamental that clauses deliberately inserted in a constitution, especially
by way of amendment, are not to be tossed aside as meaningless. 60 2
So far, so good. But other language in Section 7 is also directly in
point:
"Every person who has the . . . title . . . shall be entitled to an
exemption ... up to the assessed valuation of Five Thousand Dol-
lars on the said home and contiguous real property . . ... Said title
may be held by the entireties, jointly, or in common with others,
and said exemption may be apportioned among such of the owners
as shall reside thereon, as their respective interests shall ap-
pear .... "
These last words, taken alone, may be read as indicating a limit of one
exclusion per home and contiguous realty embraced in any title. Yet every
person who has the title is expressly granted an exclusion; and this exclu-
sion, which is limited to not over $5,000 of the assessed valuation, runs
to each person rather than to each title. The language first discussed,
which follows immediately after the above passage, also evidences a dis-
tinction betwen the exclusion itself and the $5,000 ceiling, in that it
speaks of "no such exemption of more than Five Thousand Dollars.. .. "
It is to be hoped that the Gordian knot will eventually be cut by ref-
erence to the manifest purpose of the amendment, namely, to accord each
owner of a residence, whether of himself or of his dependents, one exclu-
sion of not over $5,000 from his taxable base computed thereon, regard-
less of how title is held from a formal legal angle. Economically, no valid
reason can be advanced for refusing the full $5,000 exclusion to each of
several co-owners when each lives in an individual "dwelling house," in-
cluding in this term an apartment legally or equitably owned. 6 ° 3 There
"'This base, for many residences, is frequently less than $5,000, of course.
0 'See note 529 supra.
...The term "dwelling house," it is submitted, should be construed in a functional
sense rather than in that used by a building contractor. Whenever distinct homes
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is no doubt that, merely by partitioning the property, each can validly
claim up to this amount; and Section 7 specifically authorizes co-holding
of title to any "real property in this State," with an exclusion to each
qualified person. Furthermore, the 1938 change, effected by amendment
of our Constitution, from the former statutory "single parcel of real prop-
erty" to the present "any one dwelling house" is presumably more than a
mere touch of style. Opposed to this is the canon, for what little it may
be worth in this situation, that exemption provisions when ambiguous are
construed strictly against the unlucky citizen, even though the weird
draftsmanship is not his fault.
As the foregoing analysis shows, no room is left for anything but doubt.
The only definite statements that can be made at present are that the tax-
ing authorities, until our Supreme Court is properly called upon to speak,
are justified in allowing each partial owner his full exemption not exceed-
ing $5,000 per claimant; and that no one envies the Court its task of hav-
ing to rule one day on this jargon that is Section 7. The decision, when
rendered, could go either way. Meanwhile the authors of this article in-
cline, albeit not dogmatically, to the view that each co-owner should be
accorded either the full $5,000 exclusion or a percentage of the assessed
valuation corresponding to his share of the ownership, whichever is the
lesser.
8. What Procedure
In the main, the procedure in the homestead tax field is like any other
tax procedure in Florida. From the standpoint of the taxpayer it is largely
administrative rather than judicial; only in rare instances does he go to
the circuit court, which has "exclusive original jurisdiction ... in all cases
involving the legality of any tax, assessment, or toll ... ,,604
Returns, assessments, and the filing of claims for exclusions have al-
ready been discussed from the standpoint of both the residence and the
personalty exclusions.6 0 5 It should be noted that the tax officials can
exist in fact, even in one overall structure, the use of common walls, corridors or main
entrance should make no difference; the underlying policy of Section 7 is met.
6 'FLA. CONsT. Art. V, §11; cf. FLA. STAT., C. 196 (1941), as amended (Cum. Supp.
1947). The county assessor may also contest in the circuit court an alteration of his
assessment by the county commissioners that he deems incorrect, REP. ATr'y Gr.
198 (1943). If sued, he is represented by the county attorney, Op. Arr'Y GM. 049-
290 (July 1, 1949).
"'Part V, 4, 5 supra.
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correct their own errors in many instances. 60 6
The mechanics of appeal as regards the residence exclusions are suc-
cinctly detailed in Section 192.19 of Florida Statutes 1941. Briefly, the
assessor must approve or disapprove the application prior to the first
Monday in May; should he disapprove, it is his duty to notify the claim-
ant, giving his reasons, and to file a copy with the clerk of the board of
county commissioners. This constitutes an appeal automatically; and
the commissioners, sitting as a board of equalization, may affirm or re-
verse upon review. The applicant may appear before the board in person
or by agent, but the board must review the disapproval by the assessor
in any event. 6 0 7 Whether the claimant appears or not, he may, within
fifteen days of affirmance by the board of the denial by the assessor, "file
in the circuit court of the county in which the residence is situated a pro-
ceeding against the assessor for a declaratory decree . ."., or he may
initiate "other appropriate proceedings .... ,,609
The judiciary has been reluctant to interfere with the discretion re-
posed in the tax assessor and the board. 610 Any worthwhile analysis of
judicial control in this field would require a lengthy article, but the influ-
ence of Section 7 on this subject may be briefly sketched. It was early
settled that, although under Article IX, Section 1, a "uniform and equal
rate of taxation" must be provided, and although assessment at less than
100 per cent of "full cash value" fails to comply with the statute,61 '
neverthless a lower assessment is permissible if made uniformly through-
out the jurisdiction involved, because no harm to anyone results.
612
The residence exclusion amendment destroyed the premise for this
originally sound view. To be sure, tax equals rate times base; and, when
all are taxed, any alteration of the one factor is the same as alteration of
606OP. ATrr'y GEN. 049-313 (July 8, 1949). Cf. REP. ATrT'y GasN. 524 (1938) (asses-
sor can correct clerical error of extension on tax roll after allowing exclusion, and
can grant exclusion after first denying it and failing to notify the claimant; but
notice of denial constitutes automatic appeal and prevents further changes by him).
6°7REp. A-r'y GEN. 194 (1948); cf. Op. ArT'y GEN. 049-380 (Aug. 12, 1949).
' 8Declaratory decrees are governed by FLA. STAT., c. 87 (Cum. Supp. 1947); cf.
Smith v. Voight, 158 Fla. 366, 28 So.2d 426 (1946); see the excellent discussion by
McCarthy, Declaratory Judgments, 3 Mri.at L. Q. 365 (1949).
6°E.g., bill in equity to enjoin; cf. Schleman v. Connecticut Cen. Life Ins. Co.,
151 Fla. 96, 9 So.2d 197 (1942).
10E.g., State ex rel. Kent Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37 So.2d 252 (Fla.
1948); Poland v. Pahokee, 157 Fla. 179, 25 So.2d 271 (1946) (realty); Hackney v.
McKenny, 113 Fla. 176, 151 So. 524 (1933) (personalty).
"'FLA. STAT. §193.11 (Cure. Supp. 1947).
81 2Camp Phosphate Co. 'v. Allen, 77 Fla. 341, 349, 81 So. 503, 506 (1919).
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the other. But when those in a certain valuation bracket are not taxed at
all, the principle does not apply. For example, if a residence is worth
$10,000 and is accurately assessed, a reduction of 50 per cent in the rate
still leaves a tax at this new rate on the non-exempt $5,000 of the base.
When, however, the $10,000 base is reduced by 50 per cent, the $5,000
exclusion renders the entire- property tax-free. Stated in another manner,
it is not enough today that assessments be equal relatively, that is, as com-
pared with assessments of similar property within the jurisdiction. They
must be accurate abstractly; they must equal 100 per cent of full cash
value. Since 1934, abstract inequality has constituted a form of relative
inequality. This subject is clearly and thoroughly analyzed by Mr. Jus-
tice Thomas in Schleman v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.613
When, a bit later, in Cosen Investment Co. v. Overstreet6l4, a tax-
payer sought a reduction of his assessment on the ground that his prop-
erty was valued at 100 per cent while neighboring land was valued at only
75, he was denied relief in spite of the manifest inequality forbidden by
the Constitution, the reasoning being that although this other land was
assessed at too low a figure, nevertheless the property of the complainant
had been properly valued.
Taking his cue from these decisions, another taxpayer, in State ex rel.
Kent Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners,6 15 recently attempted to
obtain a proper assessment of all the property in his area. He too was
unsuccessful, although the Supreme Court had already admitted quite
frankly, as "a matter of common knowledge," that "the several assessors
of this State have never assessed the property in their counties at its full
cash value .... ,"6-1 The statutory mandate to the contrary6 1 7 has
01151 Fla. 96, 9 So.2d 197 (1942). See also the able treatment of assessments
generally by Brown, J., in West Va. Hotel Corp. v. W. C. Foster Co., 101 Fla. 1147,
132 So. 842 (1931).
0"4154 Fla. 416, 17 So.2d 788 (1944). Oddly enough, this argument, although
equally applicable to the personalty in Hackney v. McKenny, 113 Fla. 176, 151 So.
524 (1933), was completely overlooked then.
1537 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1948). Relator sought mandamus, alleging assessments at
only 25 percent of actual cash value. The assessor admitted "that properties have
sold for much more than their assessed value." Id. at 253. The companion proceed-
ing against the city, State ex rel. Kent Corp. v. Fort Lauderdale, 37 So.2d 253 (Fla.
1948), was equally futile.
610Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen, 77 Fla. 341, 351, 81 So. 503, 507 (1919). The
assessor in this case was so naive as to admit on the record that he had used a 50%
basis of valuation. This was approved, even so, at that time; his downfall was due
to relative discrimination among similar lands.
61TFLA. STAT. §§193.11 (Cum. Supp. 1947), 200.06 (1941).
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proved to be a waste of words in practice. The individual assessors, who
are locally elected officers, cannot fairly be saddled with the blame; the
root of the evil lies in the lack of moral fibre patent in a large segment of
our communities today.
It might appear at a hasty glance that a taxpayer can no longer place
any reliance on the courts in correcting improper assessments. This ob-
servation is not a fair one, however. Fraud, 618 lack of jurisdiction, or
illegal procedure 61 9 will be corrected; and patent inequalities in assess-
ments, all ranging below 100 per cent, will still be given consideration, 620
provided the relief sought is relative equalization at the higher rather than
the lower of the divergent percentages used. This much was indicated in
the Cosen62 1 case.
But what of the abstract inequality condemned in the Schleman6 22 de-
cision? Has this been reduced to mere words by the recent Kent6 2 3 case?
... Fraud can be either actual, that is, predicated on intentional favoritism, e.g.,
Cooey v. Johnson, 95 Fla. 946, 117 So. 111 (1928) (omission from rolls of similar
property owned by friends of the assessor), or constructive, that is, inescapably
demonstrated by extreme abstract overvaluation, e.g., Schleman v. Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. Co., 151 Fla. 96, 9 So.2d 197 (1942) (assessment at 300% of actual value
in a business sense) ; Bradenton v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 100 Fla. 606, 130 So. 21 (1930).
'E.g., Seaboard A. L. Ry. v. Allen, 82 Fla. 191, 89 So. 555 (1921) (enforcement
of tax levy on property not even owned by complainant); Arundel Corp. v.
Sproul, 136 Fla. 167, 177, 186 So. 679, 683 (1939) (complainant not given hearing by
board of equalization); Camp Phosphate Co. v Allen, 77 Fla. 341, 361-362, 81 So.
503, 510 (1919) (refusal of board to consider evidence submitted by complainant at
hearing).
620E.g., Louisville and N. R. R. v. Amos, 98 Fla. 350, 357, 123 So. 745, 747 (1929)
(unequalized undervaluations); Walter C. Hardesty, Inc. v. Holly Hill, 100 Fla. 1130,
131 So. 134 (1930) (assessment based on flat front-footage, regardless of improve-
ments); Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen, supra note 619 ($3.00 per acre for resident
farmer; $15.00 per acre for corporations on land of same type). The difficulty is
that Cosen Inv. Co. v. Overstreet, 154 Fla. 416, 17 So.2d 788 (1944), has since render-
ed this doctrine virtually useless; today the taxpayer is helpless when his assessment
does not exceed 100%, unless raises in other valuations can be compelled. Further-
more, Attorney General Ervin has recently ruled that inequalities in percentages of
full cash value employed by the assessor do not invalidate the tax roll; "proper
proceedings" to compel "proper assessments" should be brought, Op. Arr'y GEN.
049-303 (June 30, 1949). In view of the Cosen decision, supra, the only "proper"
proceeding available is a suit to force higher assessments of those properties valued
at the lesser percentage.
''Supra note 620.
'2 2Schleman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 151 Fla. 96, 9 So.2d 197 (1942).
6"State ex rel. Kent Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1948).
This still fails to comply with FLA. STAT. §193.11 (Cum. Supp. 1947), of course; a
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Of course, this latter differs from Schleman in that the assessments were
allegedly below rather than above 100 per cent; and it varies from Cosen
in that the inequality complained of was, on the surface, abstract rather
than relative. 62 4 Our Supreme Court quite naturally hesitated to disturb
valuations honestly reached by the assessor, especially after refusal of the
circuit judge to find any abuse of discretion; the Court is simply not
equipped functionally to become a tax equalization commission on a full-
scale basis, however much one may be needed. 6 2 5
At the same time, the Kent decision comes painfully close to an admis-
sion that the Court is either powerless or unwilling to enforce the statutory
mandate of assessment at "full cash value." To the business man this
term means the full amount of cash that can be obtained for the property
in question at any given time - and the time for reckoning assessments
of realty is the first of each and every year. The Court, however, refused
to construe it as the equivalent of "current market value"; instead escape
was effected by means of the finding that in the past, presumably around
1930, the market value of the property was below the present assessed
valuation. The test accordingly becomes a matter of whim. What period
is to be used: five years, ten years, or fifty years? Should the lowest
value within the period be taken, or the highest value, or the mean? Does
a falling or rising realty market have any influence? Why bother to
assess each year if valuation is to be frozen on a long-range basis?
Viewed from another angle, how many owners of residences would will-
ingly accept in eminent domain proceedings an amount as compensation
equal to the "full cash value" at which their property is actually assessed?
Again, where in Florida can one purchase today an urban house and lot,
or a rural farm with the usual buildings, for $5,000? Yet, according to our
assessment rolls, such property does exist -at a total of hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars.
The Kent decision, one naturally assumes, is sound in the light of the
record, particularly in view of the emphasis in the opinion on failure of
fraction of "market value" may perhaps be taken as "actual value" or "real value,"
but it is definitely not "full cash value."
0 2 'In actuality, of course, abstract inequality today constitutes relative inequality,
in that property assessed at $5,000 or less, when worth more, escapes taxation entirely,
contrary to the law.
625 C. the observations of Whitfield, J., in Roberts v. American Nat. Bank of
Pensacola, 97 Fla. 411, 421, 121 So. 554, 558 (1929). Recommendations for a state
tax commission by those informed in fiscal matters have consistently been rejected;
cf., e.g., The Florida Taxpayer, Dec. 1948, p. 4, col. 2; Gainesville Daily Sun, April
15, 1949, p. 1, col. 4.
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the relator to demonstrate clearly the alleged abuse of discretion in the
form of wholesale underassessments; but the Court should be on the alert,
whenever a convincing record of underassessment is presented, not to re-
duce the Schleman opinion to a futile display of rhetoric, thus leaving help-
less those few residents that actually finance our counties and cities. Fur-
thermore, statutory amendment of Sections 193.11 and 200.06 from "full
cash value" to "current market value" would constitute a step forward
by eliminating the basis for an indicated judicial disinclination to act in
this field. 6 2 6
9. Why
It is common knowledge today that the residence exclusion, in view of
the notoriously low assessments in many counties, often exceeds $15,000.
By reduction of the taxable base to less than one-third of what the prop-
erty is selling for, its owner is enabled to evade his proper taxes as effec-
tively as he could avoid them by an amendment tripling the exclusion.
High millage rates on other property, and general curtailment of county
and municipal budgets, have inevitably followed. 62 7 In recent years
exempt realty in Florida has reached a value of well over half that of tax-
paying realty; and the residence exclusion accounts for three-fourths of
this tax-free property. 628 Special charges for those desiring services have
been necessary, such as the now widespread municipal assessment for gar-
bage collection.
62 9
... The reluctance of the Supreme Court to release a further flood of litigation is
natural under the present conditions; see the concise explanation of the difficulties
by Thomas, C. J., at the completion of his term as administrative head of the Court,
in Justice Without Delay, 2 U. or FLA. L. REv. 1 (1949).
...The dire effects of our residence exclusion and traditional under-assessment,
especially in combination, have not passed unnoticed; cf, e.g., an excellent editorial in
St. Petersburg Times, March 30, 1949, p. 6., col. 1. The financial plight of cities,
and the apathy of the states toward them, were stressed in the national annual con-
ference of mayors this year. More federal aid and the downfall of state government
were forecast; cf. The Florida Times-Union, March 21, 1949, p. 1, col. 4. The im-
portant point is that this criticism, whether justifiable or not, is growing; yet further
federal usurpation of state government is hardly a pleasant outlook for Floridians.
"28The computation is based on the analyses of the Florida tax assessment rolls
by counties for 1946, 1947 and 1948, tabulated each year in the annual REPORT OF
THE COliPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA OF COUNTY FINANcEs. In rough figures,
property assessed at two billion dollars is taxed, while realty assessed at one billion,
chiefly residences, escapes.
... Provided by general law in 1943, FLA. STAT. §167.73 (Cum. Supp. 1947). Use
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Aside from the valuation problem, our residence exclusion is itself a
fiscal freak. 63 0 While three states provide preferences giving some ad-
vantage to homesteaders, 6 3 ' over three-fourths of them and the District
of Columbia do not allow a true homestead exclusion. 6 3 2 Of those grant-
ing one, more than a third apply it against state taxes only; 6 3 3 and a ma-
jority of the others set the value ceiling at less than half that of Flor-
ida.6 3 4 Indeed, Florida is the only state offering the $5,000 bonanza
against all state and local taxes.6 3 5
Ethically, the exclusion is a Florida counterpart of the free-ride propa-
ganda developed by the Federal Government in order to enlist support for
its spending orgy begun in the early thirties. The basis locally is the no-
tion that an individual who professes to regard his public schools and his
other county and municipal services as worthless, and who is unwilling to
contribute to their maintenance, is nevertheless entitled to have his fellow-
citizeus buy them for him as a charity case. The odd thing is that when
such a person has later been confronted with the choice of removing his
own garbage, for example, he has almost always changed his mind, and
has decided that this benefit is so desirable that he can well afford to pur-
chase it after all. Whether he will later be offered the same choice as re-
gards education, police and fire protection, and various other services,
cannot be predicted with accuracy. But at all events there is no doubt
that a realistic appraisal of this confusion of inability to pay with a desire
to sponge on one's neighbors is called for in the light of local public fi-
nances, and that the time is ripe for at least a semblance of moral integrity
of disposal services by the residents is optional, of course. This "dodging" of respon-
sibilities by community drones received caustic comment, thoroughly deserved, from
Terrell, J., in Klemm v. Davenport, 100 Fla. 627, 638, 129 So. 904, 910 (1930).
6 'The survey of the provisions in other states was made by Mandell Glicksberg,
Case Editor, and Irvin P. Golden and Mallory E. Home, formerly of the research
staff, of U. op FRA. L. Rrv. Cf. 15 Assassoas' NEws-Lzrrm 33 (Nat. Ass'n of Assess-
ing Officers, April 1949).
631oIoa, Minnesota (which permits an exclusion also), West Virginia. A few
states grant tax reductions of a homestead or residence nature to veterans, but these
are too limited in scope to be classified as general exclusions.
"'zExclusions are allowed as follows: Alabama, $2,000; Arkansas, $2,000; Florida,
$5,000; Georgia, $2,000; Louisiana, $2,000; Minnesota, $4,000; Mississippi, $5,000;
Oklahoma, $1,000; South Dakota, $5,000; Texas, $3,000; Wyoming, $500.833Alabama, Arkansas, Minnesota, South Dakota, Texas.
"See note 632 supra.
135Afssissippi runs a close second by applying a $5,000 exclusion against state and
some local taxes. As regards Florida ad valorem taxes, see p. 365 supra.
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and honest thinking in dealing both with tax exclusions of this type and
with our present policy of drastic underassessment.
6 3 6
10. Influence on Federal Taxation
This topic logically belongs in Part II; but because most general prac-
titioners visualize all tax problems under a tax heading, the matter was
footnoted during the preparation of Part 1637 and assigned to discussion
here. The choice proved fortunate indeed for the authors. The problem
involved was noted with characteristic speed by one of the deans of the
American tax bar; 6 38 and sound solutions were suggested thereafter by
another able tax attorney.6 3 9 Accordingly, the matter is merely touched
upon here.
Basically, the difficulty is that our Constitution, amplified by the
statutes governing descent of homestead realty when the deceased is sur-
vived by a widow and lineal descendants, compel a life estate to her and
vested remainders per stirpes to the latter.6 40 As a consequence unin-
tended by Florida, the marital deduction provided in the Revenue Act of
1948,641 which is of vital importance to those sharing estates valued at
$60,000 or more, is in all probability unavailable to Floridians.
As Norman suggests, a ready remedy could be administered by provid-
"'This is not to say that property owners should carry the tax load by themselves.
Major tax revisions, having at least some relation to benefits demanded and received,
are long overdue. But a fortiori the burden should not, and indeed cannot, be borne
by a mere fraction of the property owners.
" 2 U. oF FLA. L. REV. 12 (1949); cf. note 4.
"'Morehead, New Estate and Gift Taxes -How They Affect Property Ownership
in Florida, 26 TAXES 491 (1948).
.GNorman, State Sponsored Tax Avoidance Possibilities in Florida, 23 FLA. L. J.
3 (1949). See generally Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family -The Revenue Act
of 1948, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1128-1130, 1149, 1153 (1949) ; Rosenberg, Estate
Taxes and Homestead Property, 21 FLA. L. J. 148 (1947). The Tax Court has
carried our Supreme Court Rules of Descent, Part II, 3 supra, 2 U. OF FLA. L. REv.
67 (1949), to their devastating conclusion in Estate of Charles E. Bedford, 5 T. C.
726 (1945); when any children exist, the mere possibility of another heir makes it
impossible to convey homestead realty from husband and wife to the wife as a gift,
even with the consent of all living lineal descendants, with the result that the full
federal estate tax, without diminution of homestead realty by gifts, is compelled.
Nor is the marital deduction available, since the interest of the widow is a life estate.
'FLA. CONST. Art. X, §§2, 4; FLA. STAT. §§731.27, 731.25 (Cum. Supp. 1947);
cf. Part II, 1 supra, 2 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 53, 60 (1949).
.'INT. REV. CODE §812 (e) (1) (B) (1948).
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ing that the widow of a deceased leaving an estate of this size, and sur-
vived by lineal descendants also, shall take a fixed, absolute, undivided
interest in the homestead realty rather than a life estate. This interest
might be a child's part, for example, or preferably a flat one-half. The
result could be attained by statute; the former descent provisions appli-
cable to homestead realty were unquestionably constitutional,6 42 and they
prescribed descent of precisely this type.
It is hoped that the Florida Legislature will be sufficiently alert in
1951 to avoid driving needlessly the citizens it represents into the never-
filled federal tax net, and will prevent this waste of money that could
provide far greater benefits if spent at home.6 4 3
11. Interplay with Murphy Act
Murphy, 6 4 4 born June 9, 1937, died by his own hand on June 9,
1939 - or at least so it seemed. But death came slowly. Since that date
he has remained in a coma yet alive still, and has kept the bar in a tur-
moil, thanks to his strain of strong homestead blood. The many problems
that have arisen, and that may yet confront the practitioner by reason of
this seeming corpse, are not *ithin the purview of this discussion.
From the homestead standpoint, however, the redemption period of ten
years, reckoned from the date of sale, to any person other than the owner
of the property, of any tax certificate that was more than two years old
on June 9, 1937, is of direct significance; the redemption period for non-
homestead realty was only two years.6 4 5 It is probable that the ten-year
redemption period does not apply to tax deeds to homestead realty ob-
tained from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, following
automatic vesting in the State of Florida on June 9, 1939, of fee simple
"'Cf. Nesmith v. Nesmith, 155 Fla. 823, 21 So.2d 789 (1945). The superseded
provisions are FRA. Comr,. GEN. LAws §5484, 5493 (1927); cf. 2 U. oF F A. L. REv.
58-59 (1949).
04 According to Wahl, The Assessment and Collection of Federal Income Taxes,
3 MAR L. Q. 200 n.1 (1949), the federal taxgatherers, for the fiscal year ended
June 30, 1948, extracted $392,217,125-55 from Floridians. This is suffident to meet
our state budget at peak figures for over.three years; what Floridian get in return,
aside from defense, would hardly characterize this as a sound investment.
e"Fla. Laws 1937, c. 18296. Portions carried forward as stll effective are found
in FLA. STAT. §§192.35-192.37 (1941), 192.38 (Cum. Supp. 1947). Cf. also FLA. STAT.
§§19239, 192.45, 192.46 (1941), 192.47-192.50 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
0'4FrA. STAT. §§19235 (non-homestead), 192.36 (homestead) (1941). This means
"homestead" in the true sense; family headship is required.
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title to all lands against which there remained outstanding certificates
already more than two years old on June 9, 1937; 646 but the issue is not
free from doubt.647
CONCLUSION
As stated at the outset, this article does not purport to view our home-
stead chameleon from every conceivable angle, but rather to sketch his out-
line and the colorings by which he can be recognized in his Florida habitat.
His puffy red throat is largely bluff; he depends, for his well-known
protection against predatory jurists, upon camouflage while perched, and
speed over short distances when discovered. The judiciary occasionally
pulls off his tail; but he merely grows a new one.
Four leading species are readily distinguishable: homestead realty
forced sale, homestead personalty forced sale, residence tax exclusion, and
homestead personalty tax exclusion. Sports do exist; but their practical
import is slight, and their relationship to the genus is for the most part
one of name only.6 48 The two forced sale species are hardier, and are
found throughout the United States; the tax varieties prefer the milder
climate and rural background of the South and Middle West, although one
pygmy offshoot has been noted as far north as Wyoming.6 4 9
The realty forced sale chameleon feeds chiefly on creditors and second
wives, although the most pernicious pest of all, the insatiable federal tax-
6"FLA. STAT. §192-8 (Cum. Supp. 1947); cf. State ex rel. Parks v. Sloan, 131 Fla.
232, 179 So. 402 (1938) (certificates not at least two years old on effective date of
Murphy Act held not embraced within it).
""Contrast Young v. Ewing, 151 Fla. 353, 9 So.2d 716 (1942), uith Golden v.
Grady, 34 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1948) (alternative holding); cf. Stewart v. Powell, 158 Fla.
420, 28 So.2d 879 (1947). The Young and Golden cases are somewhat in conflict,
although Chapman, J., wrote the opinion in the former and concurred in the latter,
while Terrell, J., wrote the opinion in the latter after concurring in the former.
Thomas, J., concurred in both. The Young case was not cited in the Golden opinion.
The latter decision can well rest on the first ground set forth in the opinion; and the
Young case more nearly accords with the provisions of the Murphy Act. Further-
more, it recognizes the practical necessity of setting some reasonable limitation on
presentation of old claim ; cf. 2 U. op FLA. L. Rav. 237 (1949).
.'E.g., take the following quaint passage- whatever it means-in FrA. STAT.
§372.57(10) (Cum. Supp. 1947):
"No license shall be required for a resident to take game in the county of his
residence, on his homestead or the homestead of his spouse or minor child, or
minor children, to take game on the homestead of their parents."
"'Size: $500, Wyo. Comp. STAT. §32-105 (1945).
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gatherer-spender, is unfortunately too large for him to swallow. His resi-
dence exclusion brother thrives on the productive members of the com-
munity. The former is the sole species that has ventured into the field of
descent; and, as has been noted, his camouflage has proved so effective to
the judicial eye that he has managed to roam at will even into the neigh-
boring tract of transfers inter vivos.6 50
The entire genus is indeed prolific in Florida; our chameleon may be
seen on the office walls of every attorney at frequent intervals, and is not
averse to the more austere precincts of tax assessors, county commission-
ers and judges. He is prized by both chancellors and probate judges; in
fact, there are recorded instances of their fighting over him. He is a
friendly little chap, often accompanying practitioners home at night after
playing about their offices all day; and he bobs up at the most unexpected
times in the oddest places. Students and professors, with whom he i§ not
at all popular, are pestered with him each year during certain seasons.
The bench has played the major role in his development in Florida -
and played it well. The amazing thing is not that our justices have largely
restrained him from growing into a dragon, but rather that they have pre-
vented his taking on the amorphous characteristics of the amoeba. The
unhappy judge, unlike his comrades in government, must admit any crea-
ture brought to the courthouse doorstep, including a chameleon, and turn
it back to society as a respectable member of the community. This task is
not for apprentices; but the manner in which it can be skillfully performed,
even when the foundling is sadly misshapen, is well illustrated in the opin-
ions of both our Supreme Court and our Attorney General. On the whole,
like much Florida law, the law of homesteads is there, if one will but search
for it sincerely and diligently -and its interpretations through the years
have built an integrated body of legal principles.
Its current flaws are the result of its constitutional incapacity to grow
along with those to whom it applies. The impoverished agricultural com-
"'Part U, 3 supra, 2 U. or FLA. L. REv. 67 (1949). The recent opinion in
Scoviale v. Scoville, 40 So.2d 840, 842 (Fla. 1949), contains a significant dictum:
"Aside from these limitations, a deed which has as its object the conveyance
of homestead property to a grantee other than the living spouse should be treated
as any other inter vivos transfer of real property ... .'
The phrase "other than the living spouse" indicates that, perhaps quite wisely at this
late stage, the extensive overruling referred to in 2 U. or FrA. L. REv. 77 (1949) will
not be attempted, and that the Supreme Court Rules of Descent are by now too
firmly established to be abandoned without amendment of the Constitution.
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munity of 1868, crushed in all but spirit, and leaning heavily on the two
homestead exemptions from forced sale as it faced the future with grim
determination, is not the Florida of today. Nor can this Florida achieve
her full stature while, taxwise, a large number of her citizens deem it
clever to demand more from their government each year while contributing
little or nothing toward its maintenance. The realty forced sale exemption
requires a value limit. The residence exclusion, if retained at all, should be
reduced from $5,000 to a figure that accords at least some weight to the
benefits demanded by the many present tax-free recipients of county and
municipal benefits. The advisability of repealing the engrafted Supreme
Court Rules of Descent merits consideration. The phraseology of the entire
Article X should be revised so as to express definite concepts; and Section
7 should, if retained, be redrafted and placed where it belongs, namely,
with the taxation provisions. Supplementary statutes should be reworded
so as to present correctly the meaning given to Article X by the Supreme
Court. Enactment of provisions requiring the filing of claims of homestead
for forced sale exemption purposes would materially improve this branch
of our law. Assessments for taxation should be accurately and uniformly
made at 100 per cent of current market value.
And yet, despite the obvious need for trimming the two realty species
down to their proper size, this elusive little creature as a genus still de-
serves a perch amidst the life and law of Floridians. In words that Webster
might well have used had he observed our chameleon in action: "He is a
homely little beggar, Your Honors, but there are those who love him."
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